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Abstract
In the age of global interconnectedness, we can all be equally affected by cyberattacks.
Given the evolving nature of threat landscapes, comprehensive and preemptive practices are
needed now more than ever to keep local government and citizen data secure. According to
Recorded Future, in 2019, local U.S. government infrastructure was targeted by ransomware
attacks 100 times. Cyber threats to local government systems have been increasing exponentially
over the last several years, and the frequency of attacks will only continue to grow.
Although cyberattacks on local government entities are rising every year, the challenges
county IT departments face in combating the thousands of yearly attacks remains largely
unexamined. This research study aims to understand how Michigan counties are currently
protecting their IT systems, define the challenges they face in improving their cybersecurity
posture, and address the potential improvements regarding current cybersecurity practices. This
thesis addresses these goals through semi-structured interviews and a post-interview
questionnaire with local government IT leaders across the State of Michigan. The results of this
research study found challenges local Michigan governments face in enhancing their county’s
culture of cybersecurity, operating with limited funding and support, and inability to properly
utilize state resources due to limited staffing needed to operationalize. A surprising finding was
learning how essential communication and relationship building are to cybersecurity and how
these relationships impact the culture of cybersecurity in an organization. By identifying these
challenges, policymakers can introduce evidence-based policies that will address the essential
needs of local Michigan counties and provide actionable and implementable solutions.
Additionally, it will enable researchers and cybersecurity professionals to develop
recommendations and mitigating solutions to improve local Michigan government cybersecurity.





In the age of global interconnectedness, everyone can be equally affected by
cyberattacks. Given the evolving nature of threat landscapes, comprehensive and preemptive
practices are needed now more than ever to keep local government and citizen data secure.
According to Recorded Future, in 2019 [32], local U.S. government infrastructure was targeted
by ransomware attacks 100 times. Cyber threats to local government systems have been
increasing exponentially over the last several years, and the frequency of attacks will only
continue to grow. The 2017 U.S. Census of Governments [2] states there are currently ~90,000
total local government units serving residents across the country. These local governments
collect, process, and store a vast amount of personally identifiable information (PII) such as full
names, addresses, social security numbers (SSN), birth dates, voter registration information,
driver’s license numbers, as well as other information, including court records, and business
filings. Securing government systems is essential because nefarious actors could use them for
malicious purposes, leaving millions of residents at risk for future cyber crimes and attacks.
Gaining access to these systems leaves local governments vulnerable to service disruptions on
industrial control systems (ICS) for public infrastructure (i.e., water, gas, electrical), gives
unauthorized users the ability to falsify police records and gain access to residents PII.
According to Recorded Future [16], compromised government databases can be a highly
lucrative business for cybercriminals who sell/use the information to gain access to networks,
perform attacks, and monitor desktops remotely.
Local governments are already coming face to face with such challenges. For example, in
2013, Maricopa County in Arizona experienced a data breach that impacted over 2 million
people due to the improper repair of an earlier breach in 2011 [22]. The county was later notified
that Maricopa residents’ stolen data was being sold online. This breach resulted in many
class-action lawsuits for violation of the Federal Education Privacy Rights Act (FERPA), as a
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large portion of the counties’ breached data belonged to local students. Other lawsuits included
those in violation of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) due to breach and mishandling
of PII, including Social Security numbers and banking information. Overall, this breach cost
taxpayers over $26 Million to settle lawsuits, notify those impacted, credit monitoring, upgrade
computer systems and address the breach itself. Such cyber-attacks have also reached Michigan
local governments; according to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) [75], in 2017, a Ypsilanti,
MI man conducted a phishing attack on Washtenaw county employees to gain access to and
control their computer networks. In doing so, he gained access to over 1,600 individuals PII,
including past and present Washtenaw county employees. Additionally, he accessed the county
jail records in hopes of altering the release date of an inmate. Although this attack was eventually
thwarted and the hacker was arrested, the attack cost taxpayers over $235,000. Local
governments are already struggling to keep up with the evolving nature of cyber threats, and
these challenges will only continue to grow.
The consequences of cyberattacks on local government databases extend past the overall
cost to repair and into the personal lives of those affected. The Identity Theft Resource Center’s
2019 End of Year Data Breach Report [4] concluded that once PII has been breached, “the
likelihood of identity theft increases” with actions being taken such as social media account
hacks and bank and SSN fraud. This means that the individuals involved in a breach have added
risk pertaining to not only their social lives but extensive economic impact. The Maricopa and
Washtenaw County breaches are a clear example of some of the significant consequences that
occur when local government computer security is not adequately protected and left vulnerable
to malicious actors.
Currently, academic research in local government, cybersecurity, and policy fields is
limited, especially those pertaining specifically to the State of Michigan, and the few published
papers belong to a handful of researchers. By pursuing this line of research, we are better able to
assess the various set of challenges local U.S. governments might face in ensuring cybersecurity
and cater solutions specificity to their broad needs or organizations. Additionally, the focal point
has often been on urban localities rather than a broad look at suburban and rural localities. The
cybersecurity capabilities of larger counties in Michigan like Wayne county, with a population of
~1.74 Million [51], may be vastly different from smaller counties like Schoolcraft County, with a
population of ~8,000 [51]. By researching a broader range of counties’ capabilities, we can better
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assess the varying needs of IT departments and understand the different approaches they might
require in ensuring cyber safety. In this thesis, I explore the current cybersecurity practices of
fourteen participating Michigan county IT departments to include urban, suburban, and rural
counties, and understand the challenges they face in improving their overall cybersecurity
posture.
In collaborating with local government cybersecurity leaders to pursue this line of
research, we can more cohesively identify processes that are currently working well within the
various Michigan counties’ IT departments and what could be improved. This research can
positively impact public sector security goals in gaining the exposure and resources needed to
ensure cyber protections for all constituents.
1.1 Research Goals
This study aims to understand the existing capabilities and challenges local Michigan
governments face in protecting their IT systems. This thesis discusses issues at the nexus of local
government resources, cybersecurity threats, and local, state, and federal policy. Research
findings will help add to the limited body of academic work about the study of cybersecurity
practices in local U.S. governments. The findings of this research aim to inform policymakers
and elected officials on areas of improvement to guide future recommendations for local
governments on improving their cybersecurity posture.
1.2 Research Questions
RQ1: How are local Michigan governments currently protecting their governmental
systems from cyber threats? (e.g., Cyber risk assessments, hiring practices, security
resources, information sharing)
RQ2: What challenges are counties facing in improving their cybersecurity posture?
RQ3: What are some potential opportunities for improvements that can be made
regarding current cybersecurity practices?
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I explore these research questions through fourteen semi-structured interviews of
county-wide IT department leaders within the state of Michigan. These research components
involve learning about the current cybersecurity practices in the counties interviewed, challenges
they face, and improvements they need to meet department goals.
1.3 Key Findings
Throughout this research study, three central themes emerged that showcase the current
state of local Michigan government cybersecurity practices and their challenges in ensuring
cybersecurity. First is the importance of an enhanced culture of cybersecurity within local
governments. To improve a county's cybersecurity posture, all Michigan local government
employees and leaders need to make security a personal priority and adopt an organizational
security mindset. Secondly is the need for an increase in funding and staffing across local
Michigan county IT departments. Providing local Michigan counties with the needed
cybersecurity resources will enable them to overcome any future challenges they might
encounter in the cyber domain. Lastly, counties need more guidance on operationalizing existing
local government resources as they do not have the time or the staff to implement those
resources. IT departments are constantly forced to postpone cybersecurity projects, which will
eventually cause them to become a victim of a successful cyberattack.
1.4 Overview of Thesis Chapters
This thesis presents a research study with the goal of understanding the challenges local
Michigan government IT departments face in improving their cybersecurity posture. “Chapter 1:
Introduction” establishes the importance of researching local government cybersecurity through
detailed accounts of recent cyberattacks on municipalities, presents the research goals, questions
and findings. “Chapter 2: Related Work” gives background into the field of cybersecurity, state
of cybersecurity within local U.S. government and international communities, as well as cyber
threats they face. “Chapter 3: Background” provides information as to the various aspects of
cybersecurity specific to the state of Michigan to familiarize the reader with the state’s
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cybersecurity landscape. “Chapter 4: Research Design and Methods” details the study’s protocol,
participant recruitment procedure, interview protocol, post-interview questionnaire, data analysis
process, and limitations of this research in hopes of understanding the challenges Michigan local
governments face in securing their IT systems. “Chapter 5: Key Findings” details the study’s
research results by notable themes. “Chapter 6: Discussion” addresses the key findings, includes
critical recommendations for local Michigan government cybersecurity practices, and details
future work in this field. “Chapter 7: Conclusion” concludes the implications of the findings and
summarizes the thesis. Lastly, the Appendix and Bibliography include all the research material




In this chapter, I discuss related work about the increasing need for qualitative and/or
mixed-methods research in the field of cybersecurity. I also present related work as to ongoing
cyber threats, and the current security landscape of local U.S. government cybersecurity
practices, by examining academic and industry literature. Lastly, I present related work on how
international communities address similar concerns and effectively bolster their cybersecurity
posture.
2.1 Field of Cybersecurity
Craigen et al. [11] defines cybersecurity as the “organization and collection of resources,
processes, and structures used to protect cyberspace and cyberspace-enabled systems from
occurrences that misalign de jure from de facto property rights.” Essentially, cybersecurity
protects the property of its system users from potential manipulation and or unauthorized access.
To ensure these protections of its users, security practitioners apply the Confidentiality, Integrity,
and Availability (CIA) [69] Triad. The CIA Triad is the model that governs the information and
cybersecurity fields, developed to help people understand its various moving parts.
Confidentiality refers to the protection of sensitive information from unauthorized access.
Integrity refers to preventing the modification of information, intentional or otherwise, by users,
authorized or unauthorized. Integrity is key to maintaining consistency of information across an
organization and holding users accountable for any changes made on a system. Availability
ensures that authorized users can have timely access to a system and its resources when needed.
By understanding this fundamental model, we can assess potential threats in whichever manner
they may come, technical or otherwise. Organizations that apply the CIA Triad to their
operational environment are better able to provide a smooth and secure user experience.
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Cybersecurity has both technical components and extends to human decision-making
processes. It is important to understand that the guiding model ensures protections across the
security and information landscapes. By applying the CIA Triad, we can curate user-centric
security training, create incident response plans, and implement quality security policies [69].
Utilizing the CIA Triad, organizations can “avoid the consequences that may come along by not
understanding it [69].” This model can be violated in various ways, from direct attacks on a
system to network reconnaissance and even human error. Many tools have been developed as
countermeasures for the more technical element of system failures. However, less development
has focused on protecting against the human element and even more so on the convergence of
these two elements. This thesis focuses its research on applying qualitative methods to the
quantitative field of cybersecurity to better understand the multitude of aspects, technical and
non-technical, that impact a local government’s ability to ensure cybersecurity protections.
According to Fujs et al. [24], applying qualitative methods, in this case, interviews, to
cybersecurity research can often provide “deeper insight than sampling that resembles random
sampling in quantitative methods.” By utilizing qualitative methods, we can examine how
security practitioners tackle cybersecurity challenges in their organization and their thoughts on
the topics covered in this thesis’s interview protocol. Technologies are developed to aid people in
their everyday lives, not hinder their everyday processes. Taking a qualitative approach to a
quantitative subject will allow for closer examination of existing challenges in bolstering a local
government’s cybersecurity posture, organizational security culture and “enable usable, livable,
and inclusive cybersecurity [61].”
2.2 State of Local U.S. Government Cybersecurity
Although cyberattacks on local government entities are rising every year, the challenges
county IT departments face in combating the thousands of yearly attacks remains largely
unexamined. This gap in scholarly literature has been noted by Norris et al., who, in 2020,
conducted the first nationwide survey of local government cybersecurity, stating research in this
field is “the subject of few systematic studies [19].” They examined the current state of
cybersecurity in local U.S. governments and produced baseline data for future research in this
field. This study found that although local government computer systems “are under constant
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cyberattack [19],” it is the human element of cybersecurity that is their biggest challenge. They
proposed the application of theories that help explain “why one set of governments might appear
to have better cyber-outcomes than another.” One of the suggested theories is the political
science theory of incrementalism [26], which holds that no one person will hold all the
information needed to make a rational decision and thoroughly address all problems because the
problems themselves are not fully defined. By hearing from a wide variety of IT department
leaders across the state of Michigan, we can identify the pain points local governments face in
the cybersecurity space and amalgamate potential solutions. The theory of incrementalism “has
been applied successfully to understand the adoption, use, and impacts of both IT and
e-government among local governments [19].” Incrementalism inspired the interview questions
for this research in which I asked participants about their frequency of cybersecurity training,
overall improvements they have seen in their departments, and open-ended questions about cyber
incidents their department has faced. This research paper covered challenges within local
government cybersecurity such as “insufficient funding and staffing; problems of governance;
and insufficient or under-enforced cybersecurity policies [19],” but did not thoroughly examine
the roles and relationships between the end-user, IT department, and county leaders and how that
impacts the organization’s culture of cybersecurity.
Organizations like the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) have
produced industry research relating to the cybersecurity policies and regulations local
governments have to prevent them from attacks. Their 2017 research report “Cybersecurity:
Protecting Local Government Digital Resources” [19] describes findings from a nationwide
cybersecurity survey of the IT managers within local governments to identify the challenges they
face in bettering current practices. This survey found that local governments want more
situational awareness on the cyber threat landscape, as 41% of the local U.S. governments
surveyed do not know how often they experience breaches and, 27.6% do not know the
frequency or type of attacks that are targeting them. These troubling percentages dictated the
interview questions regarding identifying the root cause and frequency of attacks allowing for
comparisons between their survey and my own. Survey results also found that additional
funding, better security policies, and awareness amongst local government employees were
needed to ensure their systems. Moreover, their data showed subpar levels of cybersecurity
awareness and support among key local government personnel. To ensure enhanced
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cybersecurity protections for organizations, there must be support given and action taken from
those in leadership positions. ICMA proposed measures to improve security, both technical and
cultural, to include updated hardware, software, and better employee training. Ultimately, this
report shed light on the problems a broad number of local government units face but was not
specific to the difference in challenges that local government might face by state.
Local government leadership, particularly elected officials, are elected to serve their
constituents, so they often balance between what needs to be done and what constituents want.
Macmanus et al. examined the stressors put on public officials to “balance privacy protection and
transparency in cybersecurity policymaking [33].” Researchers surveyed Florida county
government officials, which identified the pressure officials face in protecting a variety of
citizens’ data such as medical records, finances, and employee information. They found that
local government leaders are experiencing considerable cross-pressures “to be more transparent
and, at the same time, to be more attentive to securing data that might threaten individual privacy
rights [33].” These often conflicting demands are becoming even harder to balance within
cybersecurity as “fear of cyberattacks, even among small localities, is a growing concern” due to
an increase in “retaliation-driven cyberattacks” on public sector employees who have “resisted
requests to release information because of privacy-related rules and regulations [33]. The results
recommend an increase in funding, training, software, and clearer standards to promote a balance
between privacy and cybersecurity. These findings gave insight into the balancing act local
government officials often have to perform in dealing with “budgetary constraints” and “political
pressure” [33] to meet the demands of various stakeholders and budgetary decisions.
The kind of awareness needed to advance cybersecurity protections in local government
is not simply a leadership stance but requires a shift in the organization’s culture towards
cybersecurity. According to Norris et al. [44], this shift in culture to understand the need for
excellent cybersecurity practices would require the participation of all stakeholders, including
elected officials. Their participation would include consistent and adequate training, practice, and
accountability when standards are not met. According to Eminağaoğlu et al., cybersecurity
training and ongoing awareness campaigns are “one of the most effective and powerful
mechanisms for mitigating information security risks [20].” One of Norris et al.’s participants
noted that “it is about being aggressive, not passive, toward cybersecurity,” which requires an
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aggressive cultural shift. The more awareness and support an organization has for cybersecurity,
the stronger its posture. This emphasis on organizational culture illuminated some potentially
non-technical challenges that local Michigan counties could be facing in bettering their
cybersecurity posture and thus enhanced my research questions.
According to a 2018 report by FireEye [28], by emphasizing the importance of
cybersecurity before an incident occurs and being proactive in their search for malicious threats,
organizations will reduce detection time and future costs of incident response. FireEye’s research
shows that within the federal government, the most successful cybersecurity tools are the ones
that improve the speed of response and identify a wide range of potential risks. This report shows
a growing need for government entities to improve the speed of response to minimize cyber risk
to their constituents’ data.
In 2017, the State of Illinois released a Cybersecurity Strategy [64] report discussing the
executable strategy and five listed goals focused on making Illinois one of the most cyber-secure
states in the U.S. Their goals include protecting their CIA Triad and cyber-resiliency to deliver
critical services to its citizens, reduce cyber risk by increasing cyber awareness, improving cyber
capabilities, creation of enterprise-level cybersecurity programs, and establishing themselves as a
leader in cybersecurity through partnerships with the public and private sectors. This report
helped understand the various steps and defining strategies state government actors can take to
protect their constituents. Some of these strategies include “an evaluation of current capabilities,
cybersecurity maturity and risk assessments, input from leadership from state agencies, boards
and commissions and evaluation of the current and evolving cyber threat landscape [64].”
Moreover, the report addressed its threat context, including protecting citizens, critical
infrastructure, the economy, innovation, and health services. By addressing their goals and
potential outcomes, citizens can better understand how their state government is protecting their
rights in cyberspace. Publicly providing clear information about the steps the government is
taking to safeguard constituents helps build trust and a culture of cybersecurity between users
and the government. Additionally, it provided details about their plans in applying cyber risk
management frameworks such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Cybersecurity Framework, which was created in collaboration with the public and private sectors
[43]. This framework consists of “standards, guidelines, and practices to promote the protection
of critical infrastructure [43].” Due to its flexible, repeatable, and cost-effective approach, local
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governments would find this framework valuable in assessing cyber risk and prioritizing tasks
needed to implement system improvements. Other state and local government entities are also
applying the NIST Cybersecurity Framework to self-assess their cyber risk. Some of these
entities include Contra Costa County (C.A.) Employment & Human Services Department,
Florida Agency for State Technology, City of Houston, and the Texas Department of Information
Resources [66]. Overall, this report allows for greater accessibility in holding policymakers and
government officials accountable for their listed goals in protecting Illinois residents while
providing information on actionable frameworks to implement in an organization. Applying
similar measures in Michigan focused on appropriate risk management and holding officials
accountable may lead to a more developed culture of cybersecurity.
Regardless of frameworks and policies in place, to protect residents to the caliber equal to
the rise in cyberattacks, local governments need more resources. According to Norris et al. [44],
“insufficient funding and staffing” are one of the barriers that local governments face “in
providing high levels of cybersecurity” and accordingly lack the budget or staffing needed to
secure the data. Specifically, this disparity affects smaller communities due to their inherent
smaller budget from population size and the vast differences in budget allocation across U.S.
states. Due to insufficient funding, local governments are often forced to find alternative means
of handling I.T. and security operations, generally by outsourcing contractors. According to
Norris et al. [44], one county in their focus group reported that they were running 90% on cloud
computing infrastructure, which involves transferring “much of the responsibility of securing the
data and services to the cloud service providers for whom it is a central part of their business.”
Other participants also stated they were starting “to view cybersecurity as a commodity or a
service that they purchase on the market” rather than something integral to their in-house I.T.
operations. This is mainly due to perceived cost-saving measures and the lessening of
responsibilities on small departments.
Moreover, the culture of cybersecurity within local government organizations, and its
effect on limited budgeting for cybersecurity, make low-income communities (often rural)
adversely vulnerable to security risks. In the U.S., the total amount of money a local government
has to allocate across their departments depends on their yearly revenue [68], which comes from
licenses, businesses, and taxes. Essentially, the less revenue a local government makes, the less
19
money they have to allocate across departments. If organizations are cyber unaware, they will
not allocate as much funding towards the cybersecurity budget. Additionally, this disadvantages
cybersecurity because the base costs of protecting systems are high regardless of the amount of
data and constituents being protected. However, costs are even higher during and in the
aftermath of a cyber incident. According to KnowBe4 [70], in ransomware attacks between 2017
and 2020, the estimated ransom paid per cyberattack on a municipality was ~$125,000. These
cyber-attacks can cost local governments thousands of dollars, but that is only the beginning, as
recovery efforts can range anywhere from a few hundred thousand to millions of dollars. These
high costs are due to required recovery measures, including victim notification, credit
monitoring, and the possibility of lawsuits, as well as regulatory penalties, insurance premium
increases, data recovery, audits, system updates and/or replacements, and disruption of
operations [23]. Low-resourced communities who are already strapped for funds cannot afford to
be impacted in this way, especially when lower-cost preventative cybersecurity measures could
be in place. This also personally leaves constituents in these low-resource communities at much
greater risk for cybercrimes, such as identity theft [73], if their local government IT systems
were breached. These communities, who are already facing socioeconomic inequality, will feel
the additional emotional, psychological, and economic effects of their local governments' low
cybersecurity posture. These lower-income communities face the same cyber challenges, namely
on a smaller scale, as other communities, but with a small percentage of their budget.
Cybercriminals are starting to realize how easy it is to gain access to these under-protected
systems, which is why we have seen a rise in ransomware attacks in recent years. According to
Barracuda Networks [60], in 2019, 45% of municipalities attacked had populations of less than
50,000, and 24% had less than 15,000, while 16% of municipalities had populations over
300,000. Due to a lack of funding, technology, and resources, smaller communities are much
more vulnerable to various cyberattacks. These attacks on local government systems are an
ongoing and pervasive threat that is only increasing in frequency and becoming more
coordinated. By understanding the challenges counties of varying populations face in the cyber
domain and the scale of these challenges, we can recommend potential solutions for a specific
population and improve their cybersecurity.
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2.3 Cyber Threats on Local Governments
In recent years, local governments have faced an increase in the number of cyberattacks
targeted at their systems. For this research, cyber incidents and/or attacks are defined as “a
security event that compromises the integrity, confidentiality or availability of an information
asset [5].” According to a 2018 report by Deloitte and the National Association of State Chief
Information Officers (NASCIO) [3], the top threats governments face include phishing and
ransomware. Phishing is a social engineering method “used to bypass technical controls
implemented to mitigate security risks in information systems [52].” According to PhishLabs,
phishing attacks are the “number 1 cause of data breaches [58]” with stolen credentials being the
second. As users are generally the “weakest link in the security chain [29],” this method exploits
human decision-making processes to gain access to a targeted system [52]. Ransomware is “a
type of malware (malicious software)...[which] attempts to deny access to a user’s data, usually
by encrypting the data with a key known only to the hacker who deployed the malware, until a
ransom is paid,” generally through a cryptocurrency, such as Bitcoin [21]. Apart from these
cyberattacks causing undue stress on an organization, they also contribute significantly to the
economic challenges in the aftermath of a cyberattack on an organization.
Cybercriminals do not take a day off, even during a global crisis. During the COVID-19
pandemic, they have taken advantage of every opportunity afforded to them during this crisis by
disseminating a wide range of cyberattacks across organizations. These cybercriminals have
targeted critical national infrastructure (CNI), such as healthcare services and ICS systems,
worldwide. One of these cyber events of the past year (2020) includes a ransomware attack on
University Hospital Düsseldorf [53] which comprised the hospital’s digital infrastructure and
forced them to turn patients away. This limitation in hospital capacity resulted in the death of a
woman suffering from an aortic aneurysm in which her ambulance was diverted to a hospital
further away [53]. This incident showcases the critical relationship cybersecurity has with
physical industries such as healthcare and the need to strengthen those relationships. Another
cyber incident of note is the February 2021 system breach of a water treatment plant in Oldsmar,
Florida, in which an unauthorized user “boosted the level of sodium hydroxide—or lye—in the
water supply to 100 times higher than normal [7].” Although this breach was thwarted by an
employee using the organization’s computer system, it very well could have resulted in
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poisoning some 15,000 residents in the Tampa Bay area. After this incident, leaders in the water
supply space have stated that this incident has opened their eyes to the connections between
public health and the cybersecurity of their systems [7]. Incident officials say that their goal is to
constantly stay ahead of cybercriminals and that it’s a constant game of cat and mouse [7].
Unfortunately, according to Pew Charitable Trusts, many “local governments that run water
systems lack the money or the personnel to strengthen cybersecurity [7].” U.S. local
governments do not have the resources to keep up with the growing demands needed to ensure
their cybersecurity.
According to Lallie et al. [31], as a result of such attacks, the U.K’s National Cyber
Security Centre (NCSC) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) published a joint advisory report dictating the ways
cybercriminals have been exploiting the COVID-19 pandemic. Some of the mentioned
exploitations include “phishing, malware and communications platforms (e.g., Zoom, Microsoft
Teams) compromise.” These cyber-threats have been exacerbated due to the decentralized nature
(i.e., remote workforce/teleworking) of organizations during the pandemic. This abrupt switch to
a remote workforce has made training and protecting users from possible cyberattacks and
responding appropriately an increasingly tricky process due to suggested social distancing [63].
According to a study by Georgiadou et al. [25], not only do experienced technology users report
phishing, ransomware, and spyware violations, but 53% of participants reported not receiving
any cybersecurity guidelines from their employers regarding teleworking during the COVID-19
pandemic. A survey by Barracuda Networks [59] reports that 51% of respondents state an
“increase in email phishing attacks since shifting to a remote working model” and do not feel
adequately trained to handle the cyber risks associated with this shift. Additionally, 40% of
respondents organizations “have cut their cybersecurity budgets as a cost-saving measure to help
tackle the COVID-19 crisis.” Both of these survey findings show an evident lack of cyber
readiness in transitioning safely to a remote working environment, which gives cybercriminals
more entry points to take advantage of users and their organizations. Cyberattacks are a 24/7 365
days a year phenomenon, so organizations must always be prepared for any attempts to wreak
havoc on their IT systems. These findings help us understand how the future working
environment will continue to shift in years to come and give insights into challenges local
governments will face in ensuring their cybersecurity posture evolves with this shift.
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Apart from re-centralizing an organization’s workforce, local governments can bolster
their cybersecurity posture by embracing a culture of cybersecurity. According to a 2019 report
by the U.S. Census Bureau [1], local governments are the largest part of the government in
employing 14.2 million workers compared to the 5.5 million state government employees. This
means that local government employees must reach a high caliber of cyber awareness as they are
the ones on the front lines of our nation’s IT systems and cybersecurity. Some steps local
governments can take include following best practices as indicated by the cybersecurity industry,
using secure video conferencing, implementing two-factor authentication, backing up and
encrypting data, create and follow incident response plans, ensure adequate funding and tools,
and establish a culture of cybersecurity across the county [34]. By focusing part of this research
study on understanding the current cybersecurity practices of Michigan counties, we can
recommend additional best practices and methods to address the challenges they face in




In this chapter, I provide background information about Michigan's current state of
cybersecurity operations, resources, and support. To better illustrate the state's cybersecurity
landscape, I present Cybersecurity in the State of Michigan and Recent Michigan Cybersecurity
Incidents.
3.1 Cybersecurity in the State of Michigan
The State of Michigan has been increasing its state-sponsored initiatives to bolster
cybersecurity across the state. Some of these initiatives include creating five organizations
focused on addressing various cybersecurity threats and challenges across the state. First is the
Michigan Cyber Security (MCS) [14], which handles information security concerns for the State
of Michigan and is managed by the Department of Technology, Management, and Budget
(DTMB). Second is the Michigan Cyber Civilian Corps (MiC3) [37] is made up of civilian
technical experts who volunteer their time to “provide rapid response assistance to the State of
Michigan, [all levels of government], in the event of a critical cyber incident [37].” DTMB also
manages MiC3. The third is the Michigan Cyber Command Center (MC3) [38] which is operated
by the  Michigan State Police, whose aim is to coordinate cybersecurity-related events, mainly
focused on “emergency response during critical cyber incidents [38].” The fourth is Michigan’s
National Guard, which combines the efforts of “Michigan’s Army Cyber Protection Team and
Air National Guard’s Cyber Squadron [13]” to defend “against the cybersecurity threats targeting
our state and nation [13].” Lastly, are the Michigan Cyber Partners (MCP) [40], which is a
collaboration between various state entities including MCS, MC3, and other “local public entities
across Michigan [aimed at] strengthen[ing], improv[ing], and promot[ing] cybersecurity
resources and best practices [40].” MCP brings together county and local governments IT
leadership from across Michigan and provides a means for county and local governments to
share information regarding cyber threats and best practices. Currently, MCP is pursuing projects
helping local public entities improve their cybersecurity posture through the adoption of “the
Securing Your Organization Cybersecurity Framework “and use one of their ten “pre-approved
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vendors to conduct a Cybersecurity Assessment [40].” At present, MCP is partnered with the
aforementioned organizations as well as others, including, but not limited to, CISA, mentioned in
Chapter 2, Michigan Government Management Information Sciences (MI-GMIS) [27], and the
Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) [41]. MI-GMIS is an
organization aimed at “developing professional relationships among public sector peers” while
also promoting “educational opportunities that enhance public sector IT leaders’ knowledge,
skills and abilities [27].” The MS-ISAC, part of the Center for Internet Security (CIS) [41],
works to “improve the overall cybersecurity posture of the nation’s state, local, tribal and
territorial governments through focused cyber threat prevention, protection, response, and
recovery [41].” Organizations such as MI-GMIS and MS-ISAC operate as beacons for IT leaders
in the state of Michigan to share current challenges, gain potential solutions, share resources, and
stay abreast of cyber threats.
According to a 2020 report by the National League of Cities (NLC) [35], Michigan
continues to be at the “forefront of developing an effective cybersecurity ecosystem model,”
which implements “innovative solutions to educate government employees on cybersecurity
protection measures [35].” Moreover, Michigan is one of the twenty-two states that offers
voluntary, but not mandatory, “cybersecurity training programs for state employees [35]” which
include “online cybersecurity training videos, toolkits and in-person classes through partnerships
with post-secondary education institutions [35].” Currently, this training is only “offered to
state-level government employees, [but] Michigan’s state government has collaborated with local
partners” to expand such resources to local government employees across the state. One of these
partnerships was a collaboration between five Michigan counties which resulted in the
“development of CySAFE, a free IT security assessment tool [35].” CySAFE aims to “help small
and mid-sized governments assess, understand and prioritize their basic IT security needs [39].”
Initiatives such as those mentioned in this section inform technology users about the “urgency of
complex cybersecurity issues” and helps local governments “develop effective cybersecurity
measures to prepare for potential cyber threats [35].”
One of these more policy-focused initiatives includes the introduction of S. 1846 - State
and Local Government Cybersecurity Act (SLGCA) of 2019, which was a “unanimously
approved bipartisan legislation [56]” introduced by Senators Gary Peters (Michigan) and Rob
Portman (Ohio). This act promotes “stronger cybersecurity coordination between the Department
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of Homeland Security (DHS) and state and local governments [57]” by sharing information and
resources to help state and local governments “prevent and recover from cyber-attacks [57].”
This act authorizes the DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center
(NCCIC) to continue providing “assistance to state and local governments [10]” while requiring
the hiring of “additional cybersecurity advisors, deploying sensors to nonfederal networks, and
sharing [of] classified information [10].” Specifically, they expect the implementation of this act
to include, “on average, 15 full-time [cybersecurity] employees in each year beginning in 2020,
at an average annual rate of about $150,000 per employee [10].” Overall, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) “estimates that enacting S. 1846 would cost $31 Million over the
2019-2024 period [10].” The SLGCA Act passed the Senate in November 2019 but has not
moved since then [49].
In support of expanding cybersecurity initiatives across Michigan, Governor Whitmers
state executive budget for Fiscal Years (FY) 2021-2022 included the adaptation of a One-Time
$20 Million Investment for Advanced Persistent Cyber Threats “to mitigate cyber threats from
entities that are hostile to the State of Michigan [72].” This budget specific to cybersecurity will
“be used to support a number of measures, including emergency response, threat intelligence,
and vulnerability assessments that will enhance protections for Michigan’s critical information
technology infrastructure [72].” This added investment is a stark increase from FY 2020-2021,
which did not include any added provisions for enhanced cybersecurity measures [71].
3.2 Recent Michigan Cybersecurity Incidents
Cyberattacks are a constant and ever-growing threat, especially those targeting
government systems. Chris Derusha, Chief Security Officer for the State of Michigan, has stated
that “Michigan firewalls repel over 90 million potentially malicious probes and actions every day
[17].” This section details a few recent cyberattacks in the State of Michigan since the beginning
of 2021.
On January 22nd [47], Flagstar Bancorp, a bank headquartered in Michigan, fell victim to
a breach caused by a zero-day vulnerability found in a File Transfer Appliance (FTA) software
owned by Accellion, Inc. Flagstar Bancorp states they “acted immediately to contain the threat
and have engaged a team of third-party forensic experts to investigate [6],” and reassured that
networks such as core banking and mortgage systems were not affected. To mitigate this
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incident, they informed customers of the cyber incident in March and have offered them free
credit monitoring services.
On January 23rd, Mott Community College identified a data security breach where an
unauthorized user had “obtained access to its systems between November 27th and January 9th
[30].” Some of the acquired files contain information regarding “name, date of birth and dental
plan enrollment, along with claims information related to individuals who were enrolled in Mott
Community College’s self-insured dental plan between 2014-2015 and in 2019 [30].” Mott
Community College has since then addressed the breach and notified individuals whose
information was accessed.
Total Health Care experienced a data breach between December 16th, 2020, and February
5th, 2021, involving “unauthorized access to several employee email accounts [47].” Some of the
email accounts contained PII relating to company employees and partners, such as “may have
included your Social Security number and/or member ID, claims information or your name, date
of birth, and address [47].” In recovering from this breach, Total Health Care notified those
affected, hired security personnel to assess best practices, and is “offering free credit monitoring
for up to two years [47].
In February, Saginaw Township Community Schools fell victim to a ransomware attack
that “infected the district’s computer network [8].” Investigators do not “believe any data was
stolen by the hackers [8].” The schools’ computer systems were back to normal within the week.
In March, the Troy School District’s website was overtaken by a hacking group who
posted this message on the schools’ website: “Good evening Troy School District! All the sites
connected to your district have been hacked [74].” Additionally, they posted “racial, religious
and gay” slurs, which forced “the district to take down its site temporarily [74].” This hack came
from outside the U.S. “using a known malicious IP address [74].” Luckily, no student
information or PII was compromised by this hack. To mitigate this attack, the school district has
reset its passwords.
These recent cyber events serve to inform about the diverse nature of cyberattacks that
can occur within a single location (U.S. State) and in a short amount of time (January - March
2021). Noting these events can help future researchers track trends in analyzing the type of
cyberattack, frequency, target, location, and mitigation strategies to conduct cyber threat analysis
and better understand how cyber threats are evolving in a given region. For example, the
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cyberattacks detailed above mainly target the financial, academic, and healthcare sectors, and a
majority had some data breach. This information could suggest that within the State of Michigan,
the aforementioned sectors are more prone to data breaches than other forms of cyberattacks.
Understanding the demographics of a cyberattack is crucial to conducting an effective cyber
threat analysis that guides IT leaders' management of resources to prevent future attacks.
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Chapter 4
Research Design and Methods
In this chapter, I present the methods and practices utilized to conduct this research study.
I describe the overall study protocol, participant recruitment procedure, interview and
questionnaire process, data analysis approach, and limitations.
4.1 Study Protocol
In this research study, I apply qualitative methods and exploratory analysis to understand
the existing capabilities and challenges local governments face in ensuring cyber safety. The
methods applied include semi-structured interviews combined with a post-interview
questionnaire with IT department leaders across counties in the State of Michigan to understand
how those on the frontlines handle cybersecurity incidents. Using semi-structured interviews, I
identified central themes amongst county IT departments related to cyber threats, practices, and
resources needed to bolster their cybersecurity posture.
To best analyze the challenges local Michigan governments face in ensuring their
systems, interview questions were designed to understand the various moving parts of an IT
department. These moving parts included questions regarding their user base training,
department employee composition (job roles, training, background), technical cyber threats,
department strategies, and state legislation awareness. Similar questions were reiterated during
the post-interview questionnaire to gain deeper knowledge on specific areas.
Fourteen interviews were conducted virtually using the video communication platform,
Zoom. Interviews were recorded and transcribed for later analysis. All interviews ranged
between thirty to sixty minutes in length. The study was determined to be exempt from oversight
by the University of Michigan's Institutional Review Board (IRB).
4.2 Participant Recruitment
I recruited employees who held leadership roles within Michigan county IT departments.
For this study, I define a leader in this space by their job title, ranking, and/or decision-making
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abilities within their organization. Understanding their thought process as well as success and
challenges would add context to the study. By interviewing these professionals, we get a better
understanding of what it means to combat cyber threats in a local government setting.
Recruitment was conducted by aggregating all 83 Michigan county web page URLs from
the state of Michigan’s director of counties [36]. I searched through each web page and looked
for the IT department’s contact information (email or phone number) and added it to a document.
If no IT department page or contact information existed, I gathered either the county clerk’s
contact information or saved the link for the general county contact form. Once the appropriate
contact information was acquired, I contacted the various IT departments and/or county clerks to
gauge interest in participating in this research study. The main form of contacting the
departments was done through email. The email recruitment message is available in Appendix 1.
I used Google Calendar to set up a sixty-minute time block for the virtual interview for
those wanting to participate. Twenty-four hours before the interview, I emailed the participants a
consent form to read and verbally consent to participate at the beginning of the interview. The
consent form is available in Appendix 2.
4.3 Interview Protocol
An interview protocol with six themed sections was created to guide the semi-structured
interview with participants.
The first section of questions focused on assessing the overall cybersecurity literacy of
general county employees, actions taken to enhance literacy, and understanding changes that can
be made to improve cyber safety. These questions were asked to gain perspective on the
macro-level cybersecurity practices in the county and assess the limitations and resources needed
to enhance practices for both technical and non-technical staff.
The second section of questions was focused on gaining a micro-level understanding of
the IT department’s overall team composition and existing roles and responsibilities. I asked
participants about discerning between cybersecurity-focused staff or IT generalists, job hiring
requirements, and cybersecurity responsibilities. This question was asked to get an idea as to the
makeup of a county IT department and ascertain how much of a county’s human capital is
dedicated to cybersecurity.
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The third section of questions dives deeper into the technical cyber incident threats their
department is facing. Topics covered the classification of cybersecurity incidents, examples of
past incidents handled, strategies, overall rating of cybersecurity posture, and current department
priorities. One of the questions asked participants to describe a successful/unsuccessful cyber
incident they have faced, which helped us understand what resources, steps, and practices were
crucial to the outcome. The overall section is used to assess the technical needs of the
departments that could yield more conducive results in future cyber incidents. The NIST
Cybersecurity framework inspired these questions to identify an organization’s level of
cybersecurity preparedness.
The fourth section of questions focused on local, state, and federal policy and compliance
awareness and opinions on existing and/or proposed Michigan-specific cybersecurity policy.
These questions were asked to gain participants’ awareness of the current landscape of
cybersecurity policy and gain their professional opinions on the usefulness and ability to
implement the proposed policy.
The fifth section of questions asked about staffing, security goals, and resources need to
improve cybersecurity posture. These questions were asked to solidify the main pain points
cybersecurity leaders in these counties are facing. This section helped in summarizing and
having a clear understanding of the challenges previously stated throughout the interview.
The sixth section of questions was asked if time allowed and consisted of an open
question focused on gaining perspective on lessons these cybersecurity professionals have
learned throughout the years. This question was asked to gain a personal perspective,
understanding challenges they have faced in the field and how they overcame them. This
question can often lead to more personal stories regarding their role in the departments and
professional history, which could enrich our knowledge of how IT department leadership
operates.
Throughout the six interview sections, the question of resources and challenges is asked
multiple times to gauge the varying resources needed as per the section’s theme. The full
interview protocol is available in Appendix 3.
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4.4 Post-Interview Questionnaire
After participants have been interviewed, they completed an exit questionnaire, hosted by
Qualtrics, with additional questions regarding their thoughts on their organization’s readiness to
handle cyber threats. This helped assess what systems these IT departments are responsible for,
their cyber incident handling process, technical tools they use, and changes made to their process
due to COVID-19. By asking these questions through a survey after the interview, we can spend
the interview ascertaining opinions on greater cybersecurity topics while still gathering more
detailed and comparable information about their organization afterward. Additionally, these
post-interview questions can help jog the memory of some details that might have been missed
during the interview and provide rich complementary data. The post-interview questionnaire
content is available in Appendix 4.
4.5 Data Analysis
The recording of each interview was saved to the cloud and transcribed by Zoom’s
transcription tool. Once the interviews have been transcribed, they were downloaded from the
cloud, verified, and corrected for clarity by the researcher. Any corrections made were done in
conjunction with examining the researchers’ notes and rewatching the interview recordings. Each
separate transcript was imported to Google Docs and color-coded to differentiate between
interview questions and the participants’ responses. Within Google Docs, quotes were flagged by
their corresponding interview questions. Tangential discussions relating to the participant’s
experience in the cybersecurity field and opinions on various matters were also noted.
The analysis of the post-interview questionnaire took a similar approach to that of the
interview. A codebook was developed with the transcripts and post-interview questionnaire data,
which were combined in a Google Sheets file to track emerging themes and aid in its overall
analysis. Within the Google Sheet, the post-interview questionnaire and each interview section
(six sections) had their tabs with corresponding coded data. The open coding took an inductive
approach to understand the main themes present throughout the data. In this process, I developed
the codes based on the studies set research questions and themes that emerged throughout the
various interviews. This data analysis approach is used to pinpoint specific cybersecurity-centric
pain points common across Michigan local governments.
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Towards the beginning of the coding process, themes generally revolve around the main
interview questions, but as coding progressed, it was clear that sub-themes had emerged.
Although interview questions were mainly separated by technical vs. non-technical aspects of
cybersecurity, the coding process revealed a convergence of these themes. The responses to the
non-technical questions foreshadowed the responses for the technical questions, and thus these
themes are dependent on one another. The assumed themes at the beginning of this research had
evolved as the coding process continued.
4.6 Limitations
The limitations of this research can be evaluated in three ways, access to potential
participants, the use of self-reported data, and limited academic research in this field.
Unless you are well connected within the tight-knit community of local government
employees, it can be challenging to identify the right people to contact regarding research
participation. I resorted to cold contacting potential participants through emails found on each of
the Michigan counties’ websites. This limitation resulted in a small pool of participants with
13/83 Michigan counties represented and a total of 14 interviews conducted. In emailing all
potential participants, a total of 18 counties responded. Those that declined to participate noted
not being interested or not considering themselves applicable for the research study due to lack
of cybersecurity knowledge and/or outsourcing their IT operations. Participation rates could also
have been affected due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. In a sense, the migration to Work
From Home (WFH) has been beneficial as I could interview participants in the further regions of
Michigan. On the limiting side, because everything has been virtual for the past year, potential
participants could be experiencing “Zoom Fatigue [54],” and thus are overwhelmed with the
number of virtual meetings they have to attend and do not have the mental bandwidth to meet for
this study. This limitation would contribute to having a limited pool of data for which to analyze.
Due to the nature of this study, the data accumulated is largely self-reported by the
participant. I did not examine their departmental budgets or observe their day-to-day
organizational operations, so I relied on the participants to share this information. Factors such as
interpretation of questions, rating scales, self-assessability, and response bias, can add limitations
to the data.
33
As mentioned in Chapter 2, academic research on the nature of local government
cybersecurity and its various aspects is limited and thus a contributing limitation in this research





This chapter presents the research findings from our analysis of the interviews and
questionnaire. I include a Sample Characterization and the various themes that emerged in
coding and analyzing the interview data from the six interview sections and the post-interview
questionnaire. The main themes include Michigan’s Cyber Threat Landscape, Jack of All Trades,
Vendor Relationships, It’s Not a Bug, It’s a Feature: Culture of Cybersecurity, Operationalizing
Resources for Local Governments, Impact of COVID-19, Challenges Faced in Smaller Michigan
Counties, and Recruiting Talent.
5.1 Sample Characterization
This research study included 14 interviews with cybersecurity leaders in local
governments, 13 currently working for different county IT departments around the State of
Michigan and one state cyber-focused organization representative with previous work experience
in local government. Excluding the state representative, this study includes counties with
populations ranging from a min of 9 thousand and a max of 1 million. The mean population
amongst the counties is ~317,000, and the median being ~750,000.  7/10 regions in Michigan are
represented in this sample, including the Upper Peninsula, Northwest, West Michigan, East
Michigan, Southwest, Southeast, and Detroit Metro Prosperity Region [65].
The median number of years participants have spent in their current role is 9.5 years with
a min of 1.5 years, a max of 20 years, and a mean of 10. Job titles ranged from team lead to the
director, clerk, manager, and Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). Their previous related
experiences range from working at other local governments, federal cybersecurity positions,
private sector consulting, business leaders, computer programming, network administration, and
teaching.
Regarding department demographics, the median county IT department size is six people
on staff, with a min of 0, max of 250, and mean of 30. Additionally, participants were asked if
they had anyone focused on cybersecurity or if their staff were generalists focused on broader IT
needs. Excluding the state representative, two counties stated they had at least one person
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explicitly focused on cybersecurity, and 11 indicated their staff are more generalists and thus
shared cybersecurity responsibilities. Notably, the only two counties with staff explicitly focused
on cybersecurity have the largest populations in this research sample.
For the purposes of this thesis, each participant will be labeled with an identifier, P1-P14.
A summary of the sample characterization is detailed in Table 1 below.
Total Interviews 14
County Population Range ~9,000 - 1 Million
County Population Mean ~317,000
County Population Median ~750,000
% of Michigan Regions
Represented
70%
Range of years participants
have spent in their current
role
1.5 - 20 Years
Mean # of years participants
have spent in their current
role
10 Years
Median # of years
participants have spent in
their current role
9.5 Years
IT Department Staff Size
Range
0 - 250 People
IT Department Staff Size
Mean
30
IT Department Staff Size
Median
6
Table 1: Sample Characterization Summary
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5.2 Michigan’s Cyber Threat Landscape
The key points mentioned in this section about the county’s cyber threat landscape
pertain to the daily threats aimed at their IT systems, their cybersecurity posture rating, technical
tools used to combat these cyber threats, and current department priorities.
Counties are subjected to spyware/malware, drive-by downloads attacks, and unpatched
software vulnerabilities, but the most common daily threat targeting their organization are
phishing attacks. When participants were asked about a time when assessing a potential cyber
incident was beyond their current capacity, one participant detailed an event where they were
“really worried that something had gotten in” when “somebody clicked on a link that should not
have gotten through our spam filter.” (p5) They continued, stating that the threat “had to do with
a zero-day flaw,” which had symptoms of being malware which “was a concern right away” due
to potential “lateral [movement] between machines.” (p5) The threat turned out to be “more of a
tracking” or spyware threat and was mitigated with the expertise of organizations like MSP and
MS-ISAC who are “always really good about coming up with [steps to] try this, check this, run
this.” (p5)
I asked participants to rate their county’s overall cybersecurity posture on a scale from
1-10, one being the lowest and 10 being the highest. The average amongst the 14 interviews was
a 5.8/10 rating, with some participants noting that they “don’t think anybody’s at a 10” or ever
will be; “it’s just a matter of when [they will be attacked], how serious and how we respond.”
(p6) This finding is consistent with other statements regarding county IT systems being subject
to daily cyber threats. One participant noted that “it’s a daily process and it’s a daily struggle”
(p9) to keep up with the never-ending threat landscape. Based on the types of threats, frequency
of cyber incidents, and the 5.8/10 rating above, there is a need for county IT departments to stay
abreast of any potential threats and continuously improve their cybersecurity posture.
While interviewing participants about the technical tools they use in day-to-day threat
monitoring operations, most respondents noted utilizing commercial Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) and Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) tools, with few incorporating open source
technologies such as Snort. One participant also stated having “reporting tools in place… to
protect the endpoints tools [and]...the servers tools.” (p2) A majority of respondents also stated
they become aware of cyber incidents by receiving notifications from threat monitoring tools
such as Varonis, various “log aggregation” (p13) software, and other undisclosed tools. Some
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counties are also currently trying to incorporate some built in-house tools for their “reporting and
[threat monitoring] dashboards.” (p13) They also utilize services from vendors that alert them to
“a workstation that’s really infected or if there’s unwarranted traffic” (p13) in their network as
well as handle any “incident management [and] forensics” (p12) necessities after a breach.
Inspection of data stored before and after a breach has been viewed favorably as participants
have stated: “lacking better automatic controls” (p7) to aid in post-breach root cause analysis.
Additionally, they noted not having the resources to conduct full root cause analysis due to
running on “very old” (p2) and outdated systems or legacy technology, such as Windows Server
2003 and the now-defunct Windows XP operating system. At present, 43% of participants do not
have the capability to conduct a root cause analysis post-cyber incident. They continued stating
they are “working very hard this year to get rid of it” due to it being such a “huge security threat
and until we get rid of it there’s nothing we can do.” (p2) Understanding the varied current
technical tools departments across the state have incorporated into their daily operations, it is
clear that tool usage is decentralized. There is a common need for updated technologies and
direct guidance on reporting and monitoring tools that would not only improve their
cybersecurity posture but be cost-effective to their budgets.
Moreover, participants expressed interest in incorporating new technologies, mainly those
focused on using Artificial Intelligence (AI) and automating necessary cybersecurity processes.
One participant states that applying the use of AI technologies in their cybersecurity operations
applying threat monitoring and mitigation to act as “force multipliers” making them “stronger
than we would be by ourselves.” (p6) Essentially, by using AI to automate cybersecurity defense
processes, they can free IT department staff from various tedious tasks. Hence, they have more
time to focus on tackling more pressing challenges. Additionally, multiple participants
mentioned wanting to automate inter-county security training and phishing exercises to enhance
security awareness. One participant stated that “it would be nice to have more resources in
place...better software” to automate security training “but it takes time to set that up.” (p9)
Another stated wanting to use automation to run random and consistent phishing “campaigns
behind the scenes [which] gives the users...hopefully some good practical knowledge.” (p3) One
county is already applying similar automation techniques in which they automatically enroll
employees in remedial security training when they “get caught in a phishing email, and they
actually click on a link.” (p6)
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At the time of the research interviews, the top county cybersecurity priorities include
various initiatives to bolster their cybersecurity posture, such as county-wide multi-factor
authentication (MFA) implementation, attaining new tool resources, and updating/ implementing
existing projects. The following priorities exclude those relating to the COVID-19 pandemic as
those are covered in Section 5.7, Impact of COVID-19, below. Many counties noted wanting to
“get everybody on MFA” (p6) and having that applied “on many more applications that it exists
on currently.” (p12) One county is implementing MFA “based on risk levels” in which “higher
risk groups have had MFA enabled initially, and then they work their way down the group.” (p6)
Additionally, a majority of participants commented on wanting “more tools to help us monitor
what’s going on better control better granular monitoring.” (p7) Currently, they are using “a lot
of cobbled together low cost and free [applications] rather than built to purpose tools.” Due to
the current state of their threat monitoring applications, they “can’t [appropriately] measure” and
quantify the needed data and thus rely on “feeling” and intuition to ascertain threats. “Investment
in additional infrastructure” as they do not have “as deep [and] as many layers as we would like
[for] redundancy.” They need more people and “better tools, which cost money.” (p7) One
participant also stated a “need [for] some kind of visibility tool, [like] a SIEM” as they “don’t
have a core aggregation center for reviewing a lot it’s all manual it’s all human done, and since
we don’t have a lot of human capital resources we’re trying to find a solution [to] that” (p8) as
well. Additionally, counties are wanting to “roll out [the] NIST Cybersecurity Framework,” (p6)
set up “remote access” (p11) through VPN’s, “refreshing our technical stack,” (p12), and move
to a “zero-trust environment.” (p1)
In relation to the IT departments’ user base, their priorities lie within enhancing and
“affecting the culture” (p1) of cybersecurity in their organization and expanded security
awareness. Participants are hoping to implement “mandated security training for all of our users”
(p7) as well as “continuing the momentum that we have with our security training...and making
those results visible to our senior leaders” (p9) to aid in an increase for budgeting. Additionally,
one participant stated they “have done a reasonable amount of [due] diligence for a local
government to make sure that we protect all the data we’re supposed to” and jokingly noted their
priority was to not “be the one who’s watched [on the news or in an] article on the open press...
[stating] county residents identity [were] stolen right.” (p12) Interestingly, another county also
noted that their “biggest goal is to stay out of the paper.” (p9)
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At the state level, they are wanting to set a standard rating system for measuring a
county’s cybersecurity posture. Currently, counties measure their cybersecurity posture in several
ways. Four follow methodologies and plans they created in-house, six utilize existing
frameworks, including those suggested by state/federal organizations such as MCP’s “Securing
Your Organization [55]” framework, and four take a more laissez-faire approach in conducting
self-assessments based on resource inventory, existing staff and cyber threats. To help mitigate
potential confusion between rating scales, methodologies, and frameworks, the state is currently
developing a “Cyber Incident Response” training, in partnership with the National Guard, in part
to match up with the “National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP) [42].” (p14) The NCIRP
incorporates the NIST Cybersecurity Framework discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. They hope
that by standardizing their frameworks, they will be able to speak “the same language” (p14) and
quickly assess the threat level a county is facing when calling in-state resources for a cyber
incident.
Overall, the participants shared a wide range of priorities from technical requirements
such as new tools and MFA implementation to user-centric priorities including cultural shifts and
enhanced training. They also shared the vast complexities and challenges, including legacy tech,
funding, and staffing, in reaching their goals of ensuring cyber protections for their constituents.
The findings presented in this section provide evidence that IT department leaders are making
steps towards operationalizing priorities not only for their technical operations but those which
specifically inform and encourage their user base.
5.3 Jack Of All Trades
When participants were asked about their job roles in the department, responses revealed
that most county IT department staff are generalists focused on broader IT needs rather than
having someone solely focused on cybersecurity. One participant noted that they are “too small
and serve too many customers to be able to specialize [in cybersecurity].” (P1) They noted that
although some employees are interested in cybersecurity and try to foster that curiosity through
additional training, they do not envision hiring solely security-focused staff unless there are
massive changes in funding. Moreover, when asked if they were adequately staffed to meet
security goals, 10 participants replied “No,” two “Yes,” one stated they completely contracted
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out their IT services but would like somebody in-house as well. One participant stated they
would prefer to invest in more training for their existing staff.
Of note, the two participants who replied “Yes,” operate in higher populated counties of
Michigan and have more staff than the other counties. Those that replied “No,” often noted not
having the resources to hire, so they often opt to contract aspects of their jobs to a private vendor.
Additionally, the participants who replied “No” noted that they are short-staffed by, on average,
three people. This is one of the biggest challenges they face as they “do not have the budget for
[a] cybersecurity expert.” (p2) This difference in budgeting is not equal across the various
Michigan counties. One participant noted that larger counties “are doing [cybersecurity] better”
because they have “bigger staffs [and] more money than we do.” (p2) This participant
commented that when a county’s entire yearly budget is ~$5,000,000, there is minimal to no
budget for cybersecurity or additional IT operations. About half of the participants noted that
their budgets and/or access to new equipment have increased over the past 12 months. Still, this
increase is not sufficient to tackle the wide range of projects and tasks they are charged with
operating, such as “auditing” and compliance analysis to comply with “state [and] federal
requirements.” (p3) These comments seem to provide evidence that not only are county IT
departments underfunded and understaffed, but there is a significant problem with inequality
amongst county IT budgets. This inequality in budgeting puts smaller populated counties at an
extreme disadvantage in terms of cybersecurity protections as compared to larger populated
counties.
Until changes can be made in regards to funding and staffing, employees must act as
“jacks of all trades and master of none.” (p1) This means some of their job requirements can
include anything from “desktop support” to “systems administrators,” “network administrators,”
“cybersecurity analyst,” (p3) web developers, auditing support, and department leaders. As new
technologies and regulations emerge, their job requirements must follow suit to learn and
incorporate these changes. Employees have to keep “piling on the hats” (p3), which can be
difficult because “you can only specialize in so many things[,] you can only stay [on] top [of] so
many things,” as one participant noted (p3). Since departments are short-staffed, much of the
staff’s time often has to go towards handling day-to-day operations like setting up computers and
printers for their user base, making it “really hard to think about bigger cybersecurity.” (p4)
Employees are being pulled in so many different directions, causing them not to focus on
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cybersecurity. One participant specifically stated that because of their numerous roles and
responsibilities, which include monitoring of potential cyber threats, even when they go home
for the day, it “always sits in the back of my mind, what could be going on right now” as there is
“no one to compensate [for their absence] on-premise.” (p3) This participant’s IT department
recently partnered with a Security Operations Center as a Service (SOCaaS) provider, which has
since given them some level of comfort and peace of mind. SOCaaS providers are generally
responsible 24/7 for “detecting, preventing, investigating, and responding to cyber threats [62]”
across an organization’s network. Constant monitoring of threats is indispensable as participants
have noted that they are in charge of not only their own departments’ systems but also (including
but not limited to): Data Management, Public Work Projects, Waste Management, Record
Keeping, Election Systems, Gun Registry, Board Meetings Notes, Circuit Court Records,
Property Records, All County Departments, Local Business Registration Records, Budgeting,
Accounts Payable, Payroll, Tax Base Information, County Website, Freedom of Information
Data, 911 Dispatch, Law Enforcement Records, Jail Systems, Child Support Information, Land
Management/Deeds, Public Health Data, Animal Control, Drain Systems, Youth Centers, and
Emergency Management. To ensure cyber protections across the county, cybersecurity
enhancement projects need to be well resourced and staffed. Based on the points raised by
participants, it is clear that the various roles employees are responsible for are critical to the
proper operation of a local government’s systems but are not currently being supported in a way
that matches their criticality.
5.4 Vendor Relationships
12 out of the 14 departments interviewed currently employ third-party vendor(s) to
handle anything from their complete IT department operations to various other tasks, including
security training, phishing campaigns, incident response plan writing, threat monitoring, and
general support. When one participant was asked about a time when assessing a potential cyber
incident was beyond their current capacity, they detailed a vulnerability within one of their
software applications (p1). By the time they were notified of the vulnerability and had updated
patches, they found evidence that one computer had been compromised. In assessing the
situation, they immediately called a support vendor to aid in triage and mitigation of any other
potential cyber threats. This example of a cyber incident where a vendor could aid in threat
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mitigation shows the critical role they play in supporting local government IT departments in
areas where they are limited in either training, resources, or staffing.
While many participants noted that private vendors are one of the first sources they reach
out to when faced with a cyber incident, they still face some challenges, mainly in finding the
right vendor that is near their county and that they can trust. As per proximity to a county,
participants noted their vendors’ customer service and response rates varied across counties.
Some vendors replied within half an hour; others took over four hours. One participant stated
that by contracting out to vendors, even for simple tasks like copy machine upkeep, “you start to
lose control, you start to lose the ability to respond effectively.” (p5) The participant noted that
county employees “hated it” because they had to wait hours for the appliance to be fixed when it
could easily be done in 15 minutes. Additionally, they noted the wait times were inconsistent,
ranging from two to four hours. These inconsistencies make them wary of the vendor market for
added cybersecurity services because “the response time it’s going to go down and that’s going
to be detrimental” (p5) to the department’s security and risk management. When assessing a
cyber incident, time can often work against them in trying to mitigate any potential harm to a
system. Thus response time is a critical factor in a participant’s choice of vendor. As per trust in
vendors, this relates more to vendors who provide software applications; the most common
example mentioned in these interviews are the SolarWinds [18] and Microsoft Exchange [48]
hacks. Organizations, in both the public and private sectors, trust these large tech corporations to
be at the forefront of security, but sometimes “stuff just happens.” (p6) Incidents like this make
organizations feel “powerless” as there is nothing they could do “as far as securing a supply
chain for a major software vendors” which leads to “a lack of trust” (p3) with their software
platforms. Local governments take on a mitigative and reactionary role rather than limiting a
system’s overall exposure to threats. An increase in these incidents makes organizations not only
wary of vendors because they “come to find out that [they] may be no more secure than the next
company” (p6) but also forces them to expand their threat monitoring landscape to include
vulnerabilities from their vendors. Fortunately, MCP has already begun working on solutions for
concerns local government’s IT departments have in finding the right fit vendor.
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5.5 It’s Not a Bug, It’s a Feature: Culture of Cybersecurity
This section presents findings relating to how a county’s culture of cybersecurity is
shaped by the symbiotic relationships between IT departments, users, and organizational
leadership. Currently, some IT departments feel that their county sees “security [as] an IT
problem, not as a systemic issue that affects all” (p1) and requires everyone’s participation. The
role of the IT department is to help support the county’s day-to-day operations. Still, one
participant notes staff being “irritated with us” when trying to do their jobs and protect county
systems from threats like malicious user activity. To help bridge the relationships between
technical and non-technical employees, one participant notes “work[ing] hard to just build up a
rapport to ensure that people know” they can “reach out to us” if they have any questions, often
reminding them “there’s no such thing as a stupid question.” (p3) They continue to reassure
fellow employees by doing “whatever we can to make the time,” (p3) to hear any worries they
might have in operating their technologies. This community outreach has yielded positive results
noting “a steady uptick in people reaching out” (p3) since their time in the department. This
proactive communication between county employees leads to positive experiences in mitigating
cyber threats from the users’ perspective. For example, one participant noted, “the good thing
about our organization is the fact that if a user receives a weird email,” they immediately “send a
helpdesk ticket asking us if it’s legit.” (p9) As depicted in the previous participants’ statements, a
culture of cybersecurity helps elevate the level of communication between employees and aids
IT departments in having a clearer picture of “what’s going on in the organization.” (p9) Through
these comments, it is evident that county IT departments are going beyond their responsibilities
in handling the county’s technologies and acting in a community outreach capacity to ensure
counties employees feel comfortable asking any questions.
The relationship between users/employees and IT departments is significant as employees
are essentially the first line of defense against cyber threats and vulnerabilities. When tasked
with using technology to accomplish a task, users often “found a [novel] way to do something
that they just couldn’t get an answer to before.” (p13) This new use case alerts IT departments to
assess new applications and methods which are often “not secure” (p13) and/or previously vetted
that other users could also be introducing to county IT systems. Due to the essential role users
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play in ensuring cyber safety, they must be as cyber aware as possible, which is why one county
assigns security training to “anybody who interacts with us electronically.” (p12)
Currently, participants have noted that users in their counties often do not understand the
importance of security training or the implications of breaches. One participant noted that “you
can harp on things like backup[s] for example till you’re blue, and people will not get it until the
first time” they are hacked, noting that it’s hard getting “people to realize how real some of these
issues are because they do not see them and take them personally.” (p7) These experiences make
it seem as though users do not often think about cybersecurity until a cyber incident impacts
them personally. Additionally, IT departments have seen pushback in implementing
cybersecurity training with county employees where it “wasn’t received well just because of the
culture of the county” (p8) is used to more direct methods of training rather than a virtual
platform. This participant noticed the pushback and pivoted to a method users were more
accustomed to being taught, which is “old school standing up in a room somebody in front of
them with slides,” but are now “looking to do online training program[s],” (p8) due to the
constantly evolving nature of cyber threats, entry points, and their associated training. For
example, two counties specifically mentioned one entry point being a clear target for
cybercriminals: the payroll and/or HR departments. One participant stated that someone emailed
payroll “saying that they were [an employee] and wanted their account number changed,” the
department employee followed suit and made the changes. This employee fell victim to a social
engineering attack which may have been mitigated if they had “training [which] would help with
people identifying” (p10) trustworthy requests by other employees. One county stated that
although employees were “apprehensive about taking the training at first,” eventually, the “spam
training” became the biggest help and is “where we’ve seen the best improvement” (p5) in threat
mitigation. Cybersecurity training has “raised their radar, as it were, to where they’re paying
more attention even on their personal things…[where the county] has a program set up” to use at
home” (p5) so now they can apply their new security skills to their family. Training users to have
a security mindset is crucial because “you can put all the [technical] mechanisms in place..., but
at the end of the day, it’s you and me the people behind the screens and on the keyboards and that
education is the number one” (p11) priority organizations can implement to protect their systems.
Although cybersecurity training and software applications are good strategies to mitigate
cyber incidents, a cultural shift is needed to improve a counties cybersecurity posture in the long
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term. This shift can only be implemented with actionable support from leadership within the
local government, including department leaders and elected officials. One participant states they
face challenges within the “cultural lens” (p1) of cybersecurity in their county. Often, they face
pushback from “elected officials that pretty much answer to nobody, but the constituents”
because if they “don’t like your security awareness [measures], then we sure as heck [are] not
going to tell [their] people to do it.” (p1) This “decentralized leadership” (p1) structure brings
added challenges in getting any cybersecurity measures implemented as well as added budgeting
concerns. One county notes that “it can be a challenge to get the proper funding and resources to
actually do basic things that the county needs and requires” (p8) to keep day-to-day operations
running smoothly. They continue stating that their counties finance person is an elected official,
“so while they have to go by certain guidelines...they can also do other things that we can’t
necessarily control.” (p8) In the end, county employees end up demanding far more than
“security can ever deliver, but they do not want to put their money where their mouth is” (p8)
and provide the needed funding, staff, and overall support. These comments seem to provide
evidence that IT department staff are facing pushback from not only users but leadership as well,
and thus can lead to a negative perception and culture of cybersecurity. It could also be inferred
that participants are struggling to make a convincing business case for increased cybersecurity
support.
IT departments have tried a variety of ways to improve their counties’ culture of
cybersecurity, such as a “publicity campaign [trying] to talk to elected officials and department
heads...about the importance of security awareness” (p1) to include training and adoption of
security practices such as Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). When participating in these
campaigns, the participant mentioned feeling like they are “talking to a brick wall,” and noticed
their “eyes glazing over, they start looking at their phones, and they’re just not interested,” which
is something they have “struggled with for years.” (p1) Some users even protested the use of
MFA by demanding a “stipend or some sort of compensation for using their personally owned
device...even though there was really no cost for the app.” (p1) Participants state that the
“biggest barrier to [improving their] cybersecurity [posture] is [a needed] culture shift and the
[existing] lack of ownership of the overall organizational security, at everybody’s level.” (p1)
This could also suggest that participants are struggling to communicate the information in a way
that resonates with employees and showcases how security could support their workflows.
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Moreover, one participant stated that “cybersecurity awareness training and cybersecurity [in
general] really only get a foothold if you have executive buy-in and support,” which is something
they “have not really had up to this point.” (p13) Another participant noted that to improve the
culture of cybersecurity, “it’s better to try to get buy-in from everyone involved, rather than try to
force it on them by “deny[ing] them some access to something.” (p4) The participants’ previous
experiences with leadership suggest that IT departments see buy-in from leadership as crucial to
the overall improvement of an organization’s culture of cybersecurity.
Participants shared actionable steps that could improve a county’s culture of
cybersecurity and showcase leadership’s support. They want “punitive measures to deal with
people who are non-compliant” as IT departments feel like they currently have a lot of
“responsibility, but not a lot of authority” to “enforce” (p7) training. One participant noted
although “cybersecurity awareness training [is] mandatory,” there is no “participation
enforcement [or] disciplinary action” (p13) for non-compliance like there is for the other
mandated training. They stated that similar non-compliance measures are already being
implemented with “sexual harassment [and] discrimination” trainings which “are mandated by
the personnel department” (p13) which, although not in the same realm as cybersecurity, they
would have liked to see such enforcement. By mandating and enforcing these training, users
might start to take cybersecurity awareness more seriously and evolve their security behaviors.
At present, this participant noted having only 50% participation in cyber awareness training
throughout the county. In noticing their current methods of not “reward[ing] [employees] for
taking [the training],” they are now “looking at changing our models” (p13) to gain more active
engagement across the county. Furthermore, one county was facing issues with enforcing MFA
implementation as users did not “want the program loaded on their personal phone” (p5), to
which they responded by not giving that users access to county systems. This might suggest that
sometimes, participants might not always be particularly receptive to employee concerns in
accommodating security practices to their individual preferences (i.e., RSA Token, MFA App of
their choice, etc.). Moreover, one participant mentioned wanting to “add security and technology
questions to the interview process for the organization, so that we can try to start to assess folks”
(p1) cybersecurity mindset from the beginning. The low interest and participation rates in cyber
awareness training suggest that participants’ current approach to getting employees involved in
cybersecurity is not working, and new methods are needed. Additionally, the lack of enforcement
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in counties that mandate security training and the lack of action taken on non-compliant users
also seems to provide evidence that leadership is not as proactive about supporting the county’s
culture of cybersecurity.
Overall, users do not see cybersecurity impacting their lives, and because they cannot see
its impacts, they tend not to get involved. This can be said about users in leadership positions as
well. Inversely, participants are seemingly struggling to communicate why users and county
leadership should care about cybersecurity awareness. As shown in the type of support
leadership has given above, they are comfortable finding funding for security projects, but
involvement does not seem to continue after that. Much like average users in the county,
government leaders do not appear to be involved in the security process beyond budgeting.
Every employee is an entry point into the county’s IT systems, so it is up to all users, including
leadership, to make cybersecurity a personal and organizational priority. Findings suggest that
cybersecurity is not solely a technical challenge but a communications one as well.
5.6 Resources for Local Governments
Throughout the interviews, it became clear that county IT departments are well aware of
the resources afforded to them, most likely because they have to be aware of outside resources
due to low funding and staffing. Limitations of resources are so embedded into their security
mindsets that one participant noted often having to “write [incident response] plans, knowing the
limitations of our resources,” and supplementing with “outside help and vendors.” (p2) When
discussing access to resources, most participants were quick to mention some state-sponsored
resources such as those mentioned in Chapter 3, (MCS, MiC3, DTMB, MC3, MCP, National
Guard), noting that they have been helpful with support in areas such as incident post mortems
(p1), auditing, (p8), and threat management (p9). Notably, the only two counties to not mention
and/or know about these resources are the two smallest counties in this research sample.
Additionally, participants spoke to the usefulness of resources specific to information sharing
such as the cross county and state communication organizations such as MS-ISAC and
MI-GMIS (mentioned in Chapter 3), as well as information shared by MSP, and the professional
connections formed through conferences and events hosted by the aforementioned organizations.
Interestingly, half of these participants mentioned utilizing these resources specifically when
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asked about a time assessing a potential cyber incident was beyond their current capacity. One
participant stated that they had a cyber incident recently and “was really worried that something
had gotten in so we started calling on some of our contacts especially at the [MSP], and the
MS-ISAC [to] have them look at the issues.” (p5) They stated these resources are a big help as
they are “always really good about coming up with [ideas to] try this, check this, run [that],”(p5)
noting their combined expertise is far beyond that of their small IT department. Other
participants expressed similar sentiments in stating that these organizations are a great resource
for information sharing. Specifically, they find the annual and/or quarterly round table gatherings
to be extremely useful because they hear how other counties are coping with the challenges they
face. Within a few hours, they can have “three or four potential solutions to a problem” affecting
a specific county and “can help prevent it from happening at some other local government.” (p5)
Overall, the participants' positive response in regards to knowledge of resources and active
information sharing seems to provide evidence that counties and state organizations have a high
level of communication with one another, especially in times of need.
To enhance the number of cybersecurity resources for local Michigan governments, the
SLGCA Act, as described in Chapter 3, was introduced to promote stronger coordination
between federal, state, and local entities, as well as information sharing and increased budgets.
When asked, eight participants had a neutral to an unfavorable view of the bill, with some noting
that it seems “redundant” (p13) because they have already “been doing this” (p2) through the
various MCP initiatives. Those that were more neutral on the subject noted seeing its potential
benefits, stating they “need something actionable” (p5), but were not sure what it would do for
them at the local level “other than give us another law on the books to fill up volumes of paper.”
(p5) Multiple counties also stated they see this as more of a “political” move with “a lot of hand
waving” which “doesn't really do us any good until it translates into resources.”(p8) On that
same note, comically, they see this bill as an item on a checklist where, for example, “I
vacuumed my living room, but I didn't have [it on] my list of things to do so, I put it on my list of
things to [do] just so I can [cross] it off.” (p2) Another participant noted that it just “check[s] off
a list of things people are concerned about rather than actually helping them implement” (p7) any
proposed changes. Of the six counties that viewed this bill favorably, one noted anything that
“simply increas[es] resources to battle cyber threats...let's face it sounds good.” (p3) The
participants' comments show inclinations to either strongly unfavorable towards the SLGCA Act
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or were favorably neutral.
Even with the proposed bills and existing resources county IT departments might have
access to, the one constant theme portrayed across these interviews is the challenge of
operationalizing resources. One participant noted that having access to the free resources, such as
MCP, is a great benefit because they “get a lot of knowledge from it, but then when we come
back to implement we just don't have the people”(p2) to operationalize those resources because
they are “already so busy doing so many things that are going on in the background.” (p2)
Another participant stated that their “biggest challenge [in improving their overall cybersecurity
posture] is really just having to implement.” (p4) Counties know what they want and have to do,
but they need “additional staff” (p4) not only for day-to-day operations but to train and
operationalize the suggested tools and resources. Due to having multiple stakeholders, including
administration and elected officials, they are required to complete tasks for them which “means
that it takes longer for us to implement our bigger projects.” (p4). These comments provide
evidence that to best utilize the vast resources the state of Michigan offers, they need funding and
staff to operationalize the suggestion of these state-sponsored initiatives.
Overall, it is clear that participants favor more actionable and interactive initiatives like
those with organizations such as MCP, MC3, and DTMB, that communicate directly to counties’
IT departments. They prefer these interactions over the “political atmosphere” (p5) that comes
with legislation such as the SLGCA Act. The overall piqued responses to this bill can be
expected, considering federal and state legislation does not directly affect their everyday
operations. Regardless of any proposed bills or increases in operational resources, counties need
an increase in staff and budget to accurately operationalize any suggested tools, training, incident
response plans, or act on given cyber threat information.
5.7 Impact of COVID-19
At the start of the COVID-19 Pandemic, Michigan county IT departments faced major
shifts in cybersecurity priorities from those detailed in the previous section (5.5.1), namely
tackling user training and resource allocation challenges. As county employees migrated to Work
From Home (WFH), IT departments had to quickly adopt secure remote access measures such as
enabling a Virtual Private Network (VPN) and Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), including
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“RSA tokens” (p14) on all work devices. One participant stated that the “pandemic put a lot of
[projects on] hold” because their “priorities changed in an instant.” (p5) Participants were
suddenly tasked with assessing county employees’ varied technical ability to make sure they
knew how to apply remote access measures and “mak[e] sure they understood their
responsibilities.” (p5) The procedural aspect in moving to a WFH environment is critical to the
cyber awareness of users. IT staff have had to inform county employees of operational security
measures such that their “kids can’t play [games]” (p5) on the county’s devices, which had
already happened. This rapid evolution to a decentralized working environment not only
demanded a shift in the technical operations and connectivity of a counties systems, but a shift in
training procedures for users to ensure “a safe environment for them and for us” (p11) as cyber
threats do not stop, even for a pandemic. One of these pandemic-specific cyber threats includes
seeing an increase in phishing activity targeted at county employees, luring them in with topics
stating “click here for the new COVID-19 policy” (p1).
One participant stated that before the COVID-19 pandemic, “5 people were working
remotely” whereas now, “it’s in the neighborhood of [a few hundred] so [remote working] has
definitely exploded.” (p1) Another participant noted the counties “mindset and technology was
geared towards 95% [in-person] work” and suddenly operations became “90% remote, 10%
[in-person].” (p12) Due to this sudden shift, some “counties and cities were just completely
unprepared for their workforce to have to go remote and unfortunately they had to do a lot of
things that you really shouldn’t do security-wise.” (p8) This rapid transition in day-to-day
operations can often leave participants wondering, “what does it mean to work securely from
home….how do I interact with county IT infrastructure when not on campus and do so securely.”
(p12) Previously, their endpoint devices were “on premise and behind our firewall” and protected
with “security features [that come with] sitting [inside] the county networks,” but now these
endpoints are “sitting in people’s homes” away from their vast security features. (p12) IT
department leaders were now having to coordinate hundreds of employees to a new working
environment having to take into consideration the various avenues of entry where cybercriminals
might gain access to the county’s IT systems which “of course, brought a whole new genre of
security issues.” (p5)
Not only does this transitioning to WFH affect cybersecurity practices, but it also affects
resource allocation for general county staff. One participant detailed that much of their county
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staff have desktops that they cannot necessarily take home, which means staff started requesting
laptops. Unfortunately, they do not have the resources or allocated budget to cover all requests
stating “they can’t just go out and buy a bunch of laptops” as they have “already exhausted our
budget for new equipment.” (p8) Some counties did have additional funds for WFH resources
such as laptops. In discussing resource allocation during the pandemic another participant
jokingly stated, they are “not going to have somebody walk home with a desktop on their
shoulder” and instead had to ramp “up procurement and bought people laptops who didn’t have
laptops.” (p12) Overall, these comments suggest that although the requirements in shifting to a
WFH environment were the same (i.e., needing to provide staff with laptops), the outcome is
different in which some counties are scarce in extra resources to accommodate this emergent
situation. This difference in resources can vastly impact the number of security entry points a
cybercriminal can access and disproportionately impact a county’s IT systems.
5.8 Challenges Faced in Smaller Michigan Counties
The challenges mentioned in this thesis so far generally relate to limited staffing and
funding for county IT departments. One participant states that apart from low funding and being
understaffed, “they don’t have the staffing with the expertise to be able to implement [the need
changes] if they had the money.” (p6) Due to a lack of expertise and time to properly assess
cyber threats due to low staffing, “many of the small counties have contracted out their work.”
(p7) Although MCP offers “tabletop exercises” and “incident response” (p6) aid, at present, there
is no clear path to operationalize their learned knowledge into actionable steps that ensure cyber
protections for their constituents.
There are clear disparities between small and large county resources as one participant
mentions listening to a presentation on “how [a specific large county] operates their GIS
mapping projects” and simply thinking they “probably spent more money on this one system
than my entire county has [for the year].” (p7) Participants continued stating how they would like
to see a “rural counties coalition” (p7) to specifically aid smaller counties in navigating the
cybersecurity landscape. On that same note, one participant suggested “adopt[ing] a shared
model” (p6), which would help in “scal[ing] their activities more effectively” and “save small
counties they [might] never have the money [or] expertise” (p6) to tackle their local governments
evolving cybersecurity needs. This is an interesting suggestion considering it leverages “shared
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resources across their peers” (p6), similar to what MCP has done state-wide. However, this
model is more focused on just rural communities. This participant also suggested “trying to get
other smaller counties...to [also] opt-in for virtual CISO to assist them with some stuff because
they don’t have the expertise to [implement].” (p6)
The challenges noted and suggestions to improve the existing situation for small
counties’ cybersecurity environment show an apparent necessity for actionable and easily
implementable solutions. At the end of the day, these smaller counties face “the same threats, but
have different challenges in addressing them, that’s a fairly big difference.” (p7) Small counties
are actively trying to apply their resources, but are limited in not only funding and staff but
expertise and ability to operationalize suggestions.
5.9 Recruiting Talent
When asked about their preference in hiring an employee focused on cybersecurity, half
of the participants stated they value experience in the field over college degrees and
certifications. In contrast, the other half of participants said they would require at least some
college degree. Of note, two participants who require college degrees, when hiring, only do so
because it is stipulated by human resources (HR) and does not reflect their personal values on the
importance of experience. One participant stated there “is a huge disconnect in our field between
HR and technical folk” in which degree requirements are there “to make sure [applicants are]
qualified, but...none of that stuff ultimately really matters, [it’s just] part of the game.” (p8)
Another participant noted that because of these degree requirements, “we’re going to miss out on
some very valuable candidates.” (p12) On the opposite spectrum, a few participants adamantly
advocated for degrees due to the “critical thinking skills” (p11)  gained at a university.
Additionally, they noted that “security is becoming a much, much broader topic than it has been
in the past…[and] you can’t simply learn all that in one or two classes” (p6), so they need
individuals with a broader background, which a college education offers.
Regardless of degree requirements, every single participant noted the overall importance
of previous experience in the field. Apart from general technical knowledge in topics like “social
engineering” (p11) and knowing “security methodologies” (p13), participants are looking for
cybersecurity professionals who have the drive and “ability [and]...willingness to learn” (p13)
and who is a “good person to work with…for eight hours a day.” (p3) The characteristics
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mentioned of a sought-out cybersecurity professional show evidence of the importance of not
only having technical knowledge but being able to effectively communicate with your team and
have the drive to be continuously learning.
These conversations also brought up issues attracting talent as they are “really concerned
about being able to recruit somebody who wants to work [in local government] anymore.” (p2)
Participants noted wanting to invite students to professional conferences, set up internship
programs, and establish K-12 cyber initiatives. One participant mentioned wanting to “sponsor
students to come to our [annual industry] conference to see what local government is all about”
in hopes of “really building connections” (p2) with other peers and industry professionals.
Counties are already looking to form internship programs, for example, one participant
mentioned working with Davenport University [67] to recruit students from their cybersecurity
program (p6), another mentioned collaborating with Michigan State University’s capstone
program [9] (p2). At the state level, one organization is looking to partner with colleges like the
University of Michigan’s Ford School of Public Policy [50] to aid with tech governance, “help
people get organized,” and assess potential “technical and social improvements [needed in]
cybersecurity.” (p14) Moreover, state cybersecurity organizations are partnering with the
Department of Education and various labor and economics departments to establish K-12
initiatives where they will be “building future cyber leaders.” (p14) The partnerships being
formed between universities and government entities around Michigan suggest that county IT





This chapter discusses the study’s overall research findings relating to the central themes
present across interviews. These themes include the Culture of Cybersecurity, IT Department
Funding, and Operationalizing Local Government Resources. First, I discuss the key findings
and how they relate to my three research questions. Then I  present recommendations that aim to
address the challenges identified in this study and enhance the cybersecurity posture of local
Michigan governments.
6.1 Key Findings Discussion
I began the study by posing the following research questions:
RQ1: How are local Michigan governments currently protecting their governmental
systems from cyber threats? (e.g., Cyber risk assessments, hiring practices, security resources,
information sharing)
RQ2: What challenges are counties facing in improving their cybersecurity posture?
RQ3: What are some potential opportunities for improvements that can be made
regarding current cybersecurity practices?
In pursuing this line of research, three main themes emerged through the interviews: the
importance of an enhanced culture of cybersecurity within local governments, increased funding
and staffing, and guidance in operationalizing existing local government resources. These central
themes showcase the current state of local Michigan government cybersecurity, challenges they
face in ensuring cybersecurity, and recommended improvements to current practices.
To improve a county's cybersecurity posture, all employees and departments across
Michigan local governments need to adopt a security mindset. Cybersecurity is a decentralized
field that affects even those who are not cognizant of the impacts it has on those around them. By
providing local Michigan government IT departments with the needed resources, they will be
better equipped to overcome any future challenges they might encounter in the cyber domain.
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6.1.1 Culture of Cybersecurity
My research findings are consistent with similar results presented by Norris et al., who
found that “the technological side of the cybersecurity equation is not most problematic for local
government...instead, it is the human element [19].” Inevitably, a user will inadvertently click on
something that introduces malicious software to a county system. Because of this, some IT
department leaders have noted actively trying to foster a welcoming security culture for users.
The relationships between the user and IT department are essential because users are the first line
of defense against cyber threats. The more connected and knowledgeable they are about existing
threats, the more successful they will be in mitigating them. These findings make it clear that the
human being is both the “weakest link in the security chain [29]” and the most important asset in
improving an organization’s overall cybersecurity posture.
Throughout the interviews, participants often mentioned the perception of cybersecurity
being an IT department problem rather than something that affects all employees and requires
their participation. They also noted the lack of cybersecurity culture in their county being
inadvertently supported by leadership. Lack of support can be assessed by a county’s insufficient
funding for cybersecurity, absence of mandated cybersecurity training, and overall lack of
support. If a county leader does not buy into the culture of cybersecurity, whether through
additional funding or other actionable support, then their employees will not buy in either.
This finding is supported by Norris et al., who insinuates that qualities of a local
government leader who “fully embrace[s] and support[s] cybersecurity” plays a vital role in
“practicing it appropriately, insisting that others in government do so as well, and holding all
accountable when they do not [45].” Leadership from the top sets the tone for an organization’s
perception of cybersecurity.
Throughout my research study, it became clear that cybersecurity and its application to
organizations is largely a multistakeholder communications issue. Counties face challenges in
getting users and leadership to understand the importance of adopting cybersecurity measures to
their day-to-day operations. This could be one of two reasons; either users do not care about
cybersecurity, or no one has effectively communicated the potential harm cyberattacks could cost
them and their organization. Perhaps the research participants’ attitude towards users adopting
cybersecurity is outdated and needs to be updated with current best practices to increase user
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buy-in. Additionally, this could also be a policy issue in which users do not pursue cybersecurity
awareness training if not required since they have to take yearly and/or quarterly training for
other programs.
To ensure cybersecurity, local governments need a county-wide enhancement on their
organizational culture of cybersecurity. Participants have stated that users do not understand or
care about the importance of cybersecurity until it affects them directly. To address this concern,
some improvements can include a revitalized model for training that effectively communicates
the importance of cybersecurity while rewarding employees for their involvement. Although
content would be similar, the avenue’s in which to approach these trainings might have to vary
between counties depending on the staff’s demographics. One participant previously noted
seeing pushback in implementing training because county employees are used to more “old
school” (p8) and direct training methods. A few participants advocated for the enforcement of
punitive measures for those who did not comply with mandatory cybersecurity training to
promote cybersecurity adherence. Additionally, to aid the users in adopting cybersecurity
practices, employees can be more conducive to user requests in substituting cybersecurity
requirements (i.e., using an RSA token over MFA). Guidance for the on-boarding process for
incorporating tools such as MFA and VPNs in day-to-day operations could also be better
communicated.
Although Norris et al. identified that local governments need to “create and maintain a
culture of cybersecurity” to “improve their practice of cybersecurity [45],” my research
identified more precisely the relationships between users and a local government’s IT
departments and how that relationship can mold a county’s culture of cybersecurity. This closer
look at the working relationships as it pertains to the culture of cybersecurity adds to the limited
academic literature in local government cybersecurity research.
6.1.2 IT Department Funding
Throughout the research interviews, some key findings emerged about the current
practices local Michigan governments utilize to protect their systems from cyber threats or RQ1.
The first finding was that the most prevalent cyberattack local governments are subjected to is
phishing attacks, which have increased in frequency towards county employees since the start of
the COVID-19 pandemic. This was an unsurprising finding as phishing schemes are one of the
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easiest attacks to deploy and most influential social engineering tactics. What is a data breach if
not phishing persevering? This frequent threat vector and uptick in attacks over the past year
have resulted in participants wanting to automate employee cybersecurity training and phishing
exercises to enhance security awareness. One county has already implemented such automation
to include the automatic enrollment of employees in remedial cybersecurity training if/when they
fall victim to a phishing exercise. County IT leaders have stated three main cybersecurity
priorities that include: implementation of MFA across counties, finding new tools and avenues
for additional resources, updating software, and implementing existing projects. These findings
were not surprising as participants often stated they are always looking for new and
cost-effective measures to protect their county’s IT systems.
Gaining sufficient funding for basic operations is already limited, let alone having to
account for budgeting regarding cybersecurity updates and the operationalizing of backlogged
projects. County IT departments have to juggle multiple stakeholders, competing projects, and
day-to-day operations with limited funding and staff. Limited funding prohibits a county’s ability
to update systems, hire new staff, source new tools, implement cyber awareness training, and
operationalize additional projects. Similar to Norris et al., this ultimately leaves local
governments without the adequate funding to “provide the needed level of cybersecurity
protection [44],” and thus leaves them vulnerable to cyberattacks. Although Norris et al.’s
research is focused on the State of Maryland, and this thesis’s research is focused on the State of
Michigan, both studies have come to similar conclusions around funding and staffing. Continued
research on the optimal average cybersecurity funding and staffing in local government IT
departments would yield interesting findings when compared across various U.S. local
government cybersecurity postures.
Moreover, significant improvements can be made regarding increased funding for
additional staff and resources for county IT departments and established guidance on
operationalizing these resources effectively. These improvements would greatly benefit counties
of all sizes across Michigan by providing them resources to solve immediate problems and
guidance on operationalizing new tools to help mitigate potential threats. One of these tools
includes automating daily cybersecurity processes, which help free IT department staff of tedious
tasks, so they can allocate their time towards tackling more pressing challenges. Furthermore, IT
departments, especially those from smaller counties, “operate in a world of budgetary constraints
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[19]” and are forced to assess security risk through that lens. Whether the local government is IT
department employees are Jack of All Trades or cybersecurity experts, their role in protecting the
cybersecurity of their constituents is crucial to the national security of this country and must be
supported as such. Insufficient funding and staffing limit their abilities to ensure a system is fully
protected. Counties seek improvements that include actionable and easily implementable
solutions to maximize their cybersecurity posture at any budget.
6.1.3 Operationalizing Local Government Resources
Through my own interview experience, although the technical cyber incident questions
section was the longest, the most surprising findings were identified through the non-technically
focused questions. One of these most surprising findings was not understanding the technical
challenges counties face but the sheer importance of proper communication and relationships
built with outside organizations. Throughout the interviews, it quickly became apparent that
participants were well aware of the resources, organizations, and support afforded to them by the
State of Michigan. When faced with a cyber incident, 84% of participants in this study detail
their first few steps include reaching out to organizations such as MC3, MCP, MS-ISAC,
MI-GMIS, and vendors for additional resources and potential solutions. These first steps taken
by participants make it clear that developing the support network for IT departments matters.
This shows evidence that one of the most effective ways local governments are currently
protecting their systems is by connecting with outside organizations to gain information and
solutions as to the prevention, mitigation, and recovery from cyber events.
Even with these vast networks and resources, county IT departments face challenges in
operationalizing any suggested changes. Participants shared that although the resources are great,
they do not have the time nor the staff to operationalize them because of the various stakeholders
they answer to everyday and general day-to-day operations. Operationalizing some of the
resources, including incident response plans and various technical tools, requires time, staff,
training, testing, and implementation. IT departments are constantly forced to postpone
cybersecurity projects which leaves them vulnerable to potential cyber-attacks. This inability to
operationalize the resources offered by the State of Michigan will eventually cause them to
become a victim of a successful cyberattack.
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6.2 Recommendations
This research study yielded multiple challenges, technical and non-technical, that local
Michigan governments face in ensuring cybersecurity protections for their constituents. To help
in the improvement of these challenges and enhance current practices, four recommendations are
presented.
6.2.1 Involving County Leadership in Cybersecurity
As previously stated, employees do not understand the importance of cybersecurity
unless they are directly involved in it and/or it affects them directly. Moreover, employees'
perceptions of cybersecurity are set, in part, by leadership's value of cybersecurity. To help
improve an organization's culture of cybersecurity, one recommendation is to involve department
leaders and elected officials in cybersecurity events and legislative advocacy. Apart from having
them complete cyber awareness training, county leaders should also be involved in yearly and/or
quarterly tabletop exercises that most participants mentioned attending as part of events with
state-sponsored entities such as MCP. Tabletop exercises with county leaders will get them
actively involved in the cybersecurity process and help them envision the various risk scenarios
and potential cyber threats their local government could be facing. In this controlled
environment, county leaders will walk through the multiple stages of a cyber incident to identify
the various stakeholders, operationalize existing resources, team management, learn about cyber
threats, and gauge overall cybersecurity readiness. Additionally, this hands-on approach can
similarly be approached from a gamification point of view in which county leadership is
involved in a simulated hack, similar to a penetration test, which most IT departments already
run. By involving leadership in real-life scenarios, they will see how their role and choices
actively impact their organization's cybersecurity. These hands-on training exercises will help
leaders understand why making cybersecurity a personal and organizational priority is so
important and share that knowledge with their employees. Expressly, these hands-on training for
non-technical county leadership can be incorporated into the various conferences they already
attend every year. The local government IT conferences can also offer specific tracks for county
leadership where they offer not only these tabletop exercises but provide actionable steps and
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resources to improve their counties cybersecurity posture. The recommendation of getting
leadership involved in these educational exercises is not to overburden or frighten them but to
educate and reassure their perceptions of cybersecurity and its importance in organizational
culture.
Moreover, by getting leadership involved in the cybersecurity process, they will become
better advocates for their staff and constituents. To increase cybersecurity resources within the
State of Michigan, Senator Gary Peters introduced the SLGCA act (mentioned in Chapter 3),
which promotes information sharing between federal, state, and local entities and increases
resources and funding. Some key points of this legislation are the hiring of, on average, 15
full-time cybersecurity professionals, continuing cyber threat notifications initiatives between
federal and state entities, and increased cybersecurity training, but not specifically stating the
method or user base of this training. Although this is a formidable attempt at bolstering
cybersecurity budgeting, the act does not solely target sending resources to local government
entities and instead covers state organizations. There is currently no specificity in how many of
those resources will be allocated towards local Michigan governments versus state organizations.
My recommendation is that county leaders and state allies advocate for a bill to be proposed
explicitly for the funding of local government entities to bolster their technical cybersecurity
posture, IT workforce, and user training. Effective cybersecurity legislation must be clear where
funds will be allocated and not simply focus on acquiring new tools to solve security problems.
Policymakers and leaders must improve the basic framework in which local government
cybersecurity is built upon, focusing on their IT hygiene which includes patch management and
limiting users' controls, and developing an efficient and cost-effective cybersecurity strategy.
These recommendations are not simply nice to have but required to combat cyberattacks and
ensure constituents' cybersecurity.
6.2.2 Operationalizing Best Practices
The second recommendation includes added collaboration amongst state organizations, as
mentioned in Chapter 2, to operationalize best cybersecurity practices. The Michigan Cyber
Partners (MCP) group was explicitly mentioned multiple times by most research participants and
thus is a trusted resource amongst local government IT departments. The trust counties have with
MCP should be leveraged and expanded to cover broader areas of cybersecurity protections. As
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counties face challenges in operationalizing the cybersecurity practices the state organizations
often recommend, one solution could include collaborating with state organizations to physically
spend time in those counties and assess their challenges. For example, MCP could expand their
staff to include a cybersecurity professional who travels from county to county, spending a week
at each county, helping them operationalize best practices. During research interviews,
participants often mentioned not having time to focus on cybersecurity because of their
day-to-day operations. This solution would help counties have extra staff on hand, even if for a
short time, to help with backlogged cybersecurity projects, implementation of new security
measures, meeting with county leadership to advocate for an increase in funding, and so on.
Additionally, this solution could be implemented as a rotational program between the state
organizations described in Chapter 2. A program like this would be exceptionally useful for
small and/or rural counties whose IT departments only have one or two people managing an
entire county's IT systems.
This research highlights that Michigan counties of all sizes communicate but do not
necessarily share resources and are thus remaining technologically siloed. To aid the local
Michigan government's cybersecurity posture as a whole, collaboration, especially among
smaller counties, is needed. The disparity of growing cyberattacks and lack of funding and
staffing within smaller local governments calls for a need to form regional coalitions to aid in
sharing resources amongst IT departments. These smaller counties are often at a more significant
disadvantage in the current cybersecurity landscape; a potential solution could include applying
an open resource sharing model amongst small and/or rural communities in the State of
Michigan. Considering how expensive cyber incidents can become and the nature of funding for
local governments is so decentralized, smaller communities might never have the funding needed
to reach a high level of cybersecurity. As "no single model will be the best choice for a given
[12]" organization, by leveraging shared resources across these communities, they can develop
strategies specifically tailored for their communities.
6.2.3 Recruiting Talent
As funding and staffing are a current limiting factor for county IT departments, the third
recommendation includes collaborating with local academic institutions and organizations
focused on getting students involved in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics
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(STEM) and related fields. Throughout interviews, multiple participants were worried about
attracting talent to the local government tech space once they retired. By collaborating with these
organizations, counties will be able to attract new talent to the local government sector and
introduce students to the inner workings of government operations. Doing so will help build a
student to local government official pipeline that does not currently exist for Michigan county IT
departments. Hiring interns is a win-win scenario for all stakeholders. Students get to learn
essential technical skills, earn a paycheck (and possibly school credit), and gain real-world job
experiences. Counties can pursue a cost-effective measure to hiring more technical talent since
student interns are not allocated as much of a budget as full-time staff. IT departments will now
have added staff that can help with backlogged projects, find innovative solutions to existing
challenges, and help with day-to-day operations.




Best Buy Teen Tech Center
Girls Who Code
Detroit Area Pre-College Engineering
Program
National Center for Women &
Information Technology (NCWIT)
Center for Cyber Safety and Education
NSA Student Programs
CyberCorps®: Scholarship for Service
SkillsUSA
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Table 2: List of Organizations Coordinating Students interested in STEM
6.2.4 Technical Recommendations
Technical recommendations could also include using AI to automate various
cybersecurity processes such as phishing exercises and log analysis. AI integrated technologies
are dynamic and able to analyze millions of data points from inside or outside an organization to
identify potentially malicious threats and user behaviors. This would alleviate some of the many
hats and tasks IT department staff is assigned to complete every day.
As for cyber awareness training, automating training might be beneficial in keeping staff
abreast of best cybersecurity practices and allow for data collection to analyze if the training is
impactful and which topics might be more confusing for the user. Any changes to training will be
much more streamlined in this automated and virtual manner than would be if it were in-person.
Moreover, it gives the user more freedom to pursue awareness training at their speed, which
helps support their daily workflow. Additional research can be conducted to assess how
automated security training impacts users' perception of cybersecurity.
These recommendations will help county IT departments overcome some of the more
organizational challenges they face in improving their cybersecurity posture.
6.3 Future Work
There are a variety of avenues further exploration in this field could take. One would
include continuing interviews with the other 70 counties in the State of Michigan to better assess
differences in the cybersecurity preparedness of a broader range of counties. To further analyze
the data collected in this study, we could apply a Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithm
performing a sentiment analysis to ascertain the culture of cybersecurity through the interview
transcripts. Additionally, the survey methodology could also be expanded to include a recurring
quarterly or yearly quantitative analysis of the cyber challenges counties experience. This would
establish a set of needed resources across counties and help understand how their challenges and
needed resources evolve. To balance out this research in interviewing IT department leaders, it
would also be interesting to dive into how cybersecurity is perceived by repeating this study with
64
non-technical employees and elected officials in the same counties interviewed in this thesis. As
I noted the importance of the user and IT department relationship, viewing this research from the
opposite perspective could yield interesting results. Moreover, due to the lack of academic
literature, I would be interested in conducting specific research assessing the cybersecurity
posture of low-income and/or rural communities and its potential impacts on the cyber wellbeing
of constituents. Research in assessing the cybersecurity of rural communities could help inform




Cyberattacks on local government entities continue to rise every year, but the challenges
local governments face in protecting their systems remain largely unexamined. To combat these
threats effectively, we must examine the challenges local governments face and the resources
they require in ensuring cybersecurity for their constituents. The research findings and
recommendations discussed in this thesis help guide future cybersecurity initiatives to focus on
the specific challenges counties face rather than perceived challenges. By defining the problems,
we are one step closer to solving them.
The results of this research study found challenges local Michigan governments face in
enhancing their counties' culture of cybersecurity, operating with limited funding and support,
and inability to properly utilize state resources due to limited staffing needed to operationalize. A
surprising finding from this study was learning about how important communication and
relationship building are to cybersecurity and how these relationships impact the culture of
cybersecurity.
By identifying these challenges, policymakers can introduce evidence-based policies that
will address the essential needs of local Michigan counties and provide actionable and
implementable solutions. Additionally, it will enable researchers and cybersecurity professionals
to develop recommendations and mitigating solutions to improve local Michigan government
cybersecurity.
Research findings add to the existing gap in the scholarly literature by providing insights
into the current state of local government cybersecurity affairs within the State of Michigan. By
adding to the body of work within the local governance and cybersecurity spaces, future
researchers will be better able to track how technical tools, cyber threats, policy, and local
government cybersecurity priorities evolve. Additionally, researchers can compare their findings
to other local governments and continue adding to the limited body of work in these fields.
Considering the study was focused on local governments in a single U.S. state, the findings
cannot be universally applied to all other U.S. states. Based on this research and the literature
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review findings, other U.S. local governments may be experiencing similar challenges in
improving their cybersecurity posture.
The four recommendations proposed in this thesis include involving county leadership in
cybersecurity through hands-on training, best practices for operationalizing cybersecurity in local
government, including regional coalitions and open resource sharing model for small and/or rural
Michigan communities, and recruiting talent from local academic institutions and organizations.
Additionally, technical recommendations include the use of AI to automate various cybersecurity
processes and user training. These recommendations aim to provide local governments with
actionable steps to enhance their cybersecurity posture considering the resources they can
currently access. Further research into the various aspects of local government cybersecurity
should be conducted and include multi-disciplinary research methods not often applied in
cybersecurity. For example, applying NLP algorithms to perform sentiment analysis on interview
transcripts or creating datasets from research findings to aid future scholars in this field.
This research aims to add knowledge to the field of local government cybersecurity
research and provide valuable insights and recommendations that local Michigan governments





My name is Marilu Duque, a graduate student at the University of Michigan School of
Information. I am currently working on my Master's thesis, advised by Prof. Florian Schaub,
focused on understanding how local Michigan governments deal with cybersecurity threats.
Cyber threats to local government systems have been increasing exponentially over the last
several years, and with this study, I seek to better understand the existing capabilities and
challenges local Michigan governments face in protecting their systems. The findings of this
research aim to inform policymakers on areas of improvement and guide future
recommendations to aid local governments in improving their cybersecurity posture.
I would be grateful if you would be willing to spare 30-60 minutes for a Zoom interview and
short survey to share your experiences in combating cyber threats in local government. Interview
recordings, survey responses, and transcripts will be anonymized before analysis to protect
participant confidentiality.
In brief, I am hoping to hear an expert viewpoint on how cybersecurity threats are handled by
those on the frontlines and to what challenges you are facing in ensuring cyber safety.
Please respond if you're interested, and we can then schedule the interview in the next few
weeks. Additionally, if you are not the right person to talk to about this topic, I'd appreciate it if
you could connect me with the correct people in your organization.




TITLE OF THE STUDY
Local Government Cybersecurity: How Michigan Counties Cope with Cyber Threats
INVESTIGATORS
Marilu Duque (M.S. Student, University of Michigan)
Florian Schaub, Ph.D. (Assistant Professor, Advisor, University of
Michigan)
STUDY PURPOSE
The purpose of this research is to understand the current cybersecurity practices of local
Michigan governments and the challenges they face in improving their cybersecurity posture.
From an industry leader such as yourself, we hope to learn about the cyber challenges your
organization faces, needs, and or concerns in overcoming these challenges and ways in which we
may support you.
This study is part of the University of Michigan’s School of Information, Master's
Thesis Option Program (MTOP).
PROCEDURES FOR THE STUDY
If you agree to be in the study, you will participate in one audio-recorded interview, lasting
anywhere from 30 to 60 minutes. The interview will occur at a mutually agreed upon date and
time. Interviews will take place over a web-conferencing system called Zoom. It is up to you to
choose a time to participate in the study. At the end of the interview, we will ask you to
complete a brief questionnaire.
RISKS AND BENEFITS
There are minimal risks to you, most of which concern identifying you as a participant. See
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the “confidentiality” section below for how the team will address these risks.
You are not expected to personally benefit from participating in this research. However, others
may benefit from the knowledge gained from this study. As the frequency of cyberattacks on
local government continues to grow, we hope this research will help assess the type of support
local Michigan governments need in bolstering their cybersecurity posture and provide
recommendations for policymakers towards providing needed resources.
FINANCIAL INFORMATION
There is no compensation for participating in this study.
CONFIDENTIALITY
The researchers will have access to research artifacts that may identify you, including digital
audio recordings, transcripts, documents, and communications created as part of the data
collection process. These artifacts will be accessible to the researchers via computing devices
and shared computing applications (e.g., U-M Google Drive). Efforts will be made to keep your
personal information confidential, including storing all data using encryption technology and
passwords, as well as removing potentially identifying information from recordings and
transcripts before analysis. Your contact information will be stored separately from your study
responses and will not be linked to them. Your identity will be held in confidence when the
research is disseminated in reports, articles, presentations, and in other artifacts, although direct
quotes from the interviews that do not contain identifying information may be used in these
materials.
The interviews will be recorded and transcribed for analysis purposes. The transcription
processes may be aided by the use of an automated external service (e.g., Zoom). Audio files
will be manually edited to remove identifiable details, prior to being uploaded to any such
service. Following the generation of transcriptions, audio files will be immediately deleted from
their server. Researchers can manually transcribe your interview if you wish to keep your audio
file restricted.
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The research team will retain recordings until the project’s completion, at which time the
recordings will be securely deleted. The research team cannot guarantee absolute confidentiality.
Your personal information may be disclosed if required by law. Organizations that may inspect
and/or copy your research records for quality assurance and data analysis include groups such as
the study investigator and research associates, the University of Michigan Institutional Review
Board or its designees, and (as allowed by law) state or federal agencies, specifically the Office
for Human Research Protections (OHRP), who may need to access your research records. Minus
these exceptions, the research team will not allow access to identifiable data.
CONTACT INFORMATION
For questions about the study, contact the principal investigator, Marilu Duque (Email:
marilud@umich.edu).
The University of Michigan Health Sciences and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review
Board has determined that this research is exempt from IRB oversight.
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF STUDY
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You may at any time opt-out of answering questions
and/or stop your participation completely. You may also request to have your data destroyed if
you elect to leave the study. Leaving the study will not result in any penalty. Your decision
whether or not to participate in this study will not affect your current or future relations with the
University of Michigan.
Your Consent to Participate in the Research Study
By reading this document and verbally consenting to the research at the beginning of the
interview, you agree to be in this study. Make sure you understand what the study is about
before you consent. We will give you a copy of this document for your records, and we will
keep a copy with the study records. If you have any questions about the study after you
verbally consent to this document, you can contact the study team using the information in the
section above.
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I understand what the study is about, and my questions so far have been answered. I agree to
take part in this study.
Print Legal Name: _____________________________________________________
Signature: _____________________________________________________
Date of Signature (mm/dd/yy):
_____________________________________________________
[NOTE: This consent form is provided in electronic form for reading, but consent will




Hello _________, my name is Marilu Duque, a 2nd-year master’s student at the University of
Michigan School of Information. Thank you for taking the time to participate in this study,
whose overall goal is to understand the current cybersecurity practices of local Michigan
governments and the challenges they face in improving their cybersecurity posture. From an
industry leader such as yourself, we hope to learn about the cyber challenges your organization
faces, needs, and or concerns in overcoming these challenges and ways in which we may support
you.
This interview can take anywhere from 30-60 minutes. To ensure your confidentiality, any
identifying information will be removed from the interview transcripts, and any recordings will
be stored separately from the contact information. Access to data will be limited to the primary
researcher and advisor. Additionally, any identifying information will be redacted from potential
publications or presentations of this research (including my MTOP defense).
In reading the consent form sent via email and hearing more about the research, do you consent
to take part in this study?
Do you have any questions before we get started?
Let's get started.
1. Assessing Cybersecurity Literacy of General Employees
a. How frequently does your local government take action to improve cybersecurity,
and what actions are taken?
i. i.e., Security Trainings, MFA Authentication, Internal Policies, Frequency
of Actions, Etc.
b. What areas in your department do you see improvement in overall cyber safety,
including resources for non-technical staff?
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i. What resources would be beneficial to see improvements?
2. Understanding Overall Department Employee Backgrounds/Composition of Team
& Roles:
a. Do you have dedicated staff focused on cybersecurity or generalists focused on
broader IT needs?
b. What are general job requirements/descriptions for security/IT-focused
employees?
i. Do you have specific requirements such as degrees, certifications, or years
of experience required?
c. Where/who in your local government holds the primary cybersecurity
responsibilities?
3. Cyber Incident Information
a. What is your department’s criteria/classification of a cybersecurity incident?
b. Can you describe a time when assessing a potential cyber incident was beyond
your current capacity?
i. What prevented you from achieving your desired goal?
c. Can you describe a time when you were successful in assessing a potential cyber
incident?
i. What enabled you to achieve your desired goal?
d. Is your local government able to determine the root cause of cyberattacks, to
reduce the chance of it happening again?
i. If yes, what is their process in identifying the root cause?
ii. If not, what resources would they need to do this?
e. How well prepared do you think your local government is to deal with cyber
events (e.g., incident response)?
i. For Example:
1. Prepared: Dedicated incident responder with active security
monitoring
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2. Kind of Prepared: Dedicated incident responder but no active
security monitoring
3. Not Prepared: None of the above
f. Has your local government developed any cybersecurity strategies and/or plans?
i. If yes, do you feel they equip you with the right resources? How would
you rate 1-10 your overall cybersecurity posturing?
ii. If not, what resources might you need to improve your cybersecurity
posture?
g. What are the current cybersecurity priorities for your department, if any?
i. Have these priorities changed since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic?
4. Michigan/Policy Specific Questions
a. Do you or others in your local government track state and/or federal security and
privacy policy?
b. Well, Michigan Senator Gary Peters introduced the State and Local Government
Cybersecurity Act (SLGCA), which promotes “stronger cybersecurity
coordination between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and state and
local governments. It encourages national cybersecurity watchdogs to share
information regarding cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities, and breaches as well
as resources to prevent and recover from cyber-attacks with states and localities
that are increasingly targeted by bad actors.”
i. With this in mind, do you see this policy as being beneficial to improving
your overall cybersecurity posture?
5. Support & Potential Improvements
a. Are you adequately staffed to meet security goals?
b. What challenges do you face or resources do you need in improving your
cybersecurity posture?
6. Personal Ending Question (Time Allowing)
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a. Throughout your time being a leader in cybersecurity, what are some lessons




Q1.) Which Michigan County are you located in?
Q2.) What is your job role/title?
Q3.) How many years have you been in this role and/or similar roles at your current
organization?
Q4.) What is the total number of IT-focused employees in your local government, including
contractors? (Estimate is Ok)
Q5.) What percentage of IT-focused employees would you say are in-house vs. contracting
positions?
Q6.) What governmental systems is your department responsible for?
▢ Mayoral Office  (1)
▢ Data Management  (2)
▢ Public Works Projects  (3)
▢ Street Lights  (4)
▢ Waste Management  (5)
▢ Water Management  (6)
▢ Electrical Grid  (7)
▢ Other  (8)
▢ Can't Disclose  (9)
Q6.2.) What other governmental systems is your department responsible for? --- Display
This Question: If “What governmental systems is your department responsible for?” = Other
Q7.) Do you catalog and count attacks, incidents, and breaches?
o Yes  (1)
o No  (2)
o Unsure  (3)
o Can't Disclose  (4)
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Q7.2.) Do you catalog these formally (management tool) or informally?  --- Display This
Question: If “Do you catalog and count attacks, incidents, and breaches?” = Yes
Q7.3.) What is preventing you from cataloging these incidents?  --- Display This
Question: If “Do you catalog and count attacks, incidents, and breaches?” = No
Q8.) How frequently is your department subject to cyber incidents?
Q9.) In the past 12 months, how many cyber incidents (phishing, ransomware, data breaches,
etc.) has your local government experienced?
Q10.) Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic (March 2020), have you seen an increase in
cyber incidents?
o Yes  (1)
o No  (2)
o Unsure  (3)
o Can't Disclose  (4)
Q10.2.) How often do you experience these incidents? --- Display This Question: If
“Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic (March 2020), have you seen an increase in cyber
incidents?” = Yes
Q10.3.) What types of incidents have you been experiencing during this time? --- Display
This Question: If “Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic (March 2020), have you seen an
increase in cyber incidents?” = Yes
▢ Advanced Persistent Threats  (1)
▢ Phishing  (2)
▢ Trojans  (3)
▢ Botnets  (4)
▢ Ransomware  (5)
▢ Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)  (6)
▢ Wiper Attacks  (7)
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▢ Intellectual Property Theft  (8)
▢ Theft of Money  (9)
▢ Data Manipulation  (10)
▢ Data Destruction  (11)
▢ Spyware/Malware  (12)
▢ Man in the Middle (MITM)  (13)
▢ Drive-By Downloads  (14)
▢ Malvertising  (15)
▢ Rogue Software  (16)
▢ Unpatched Software  (17)
▢ None  (18)
▢ Unknown  (19)
▢ Can’t Disclose  (20)
▢ Other  (21)
Q10.1.) What others is your organization experiencing? --- Display This
Question: If “What types of incidents have you been experiencing during this time?” =
Other
Q11.) Does your organization use Intrusion detection system (IDS) tools?
o Yes  (1)
o No  (2)
o Unsure  (3)
o Can't Disclose  (4)
Q11.2.) Are your IDS tools open-source, privately owned/operated, or developed
in-house? --- Display This Question: If “Does your organization use Intrusion detection
system (IDS) tools?”  = Yes
o Open Source  (1)
o Private Owned/Operated  (2)
o Developed In-House  (3)
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Q11.3.) What barriers do you face in using them? --- Display This Question: If “Does
your organization use Intrusion detection system (IDS) tools?”  = No
Q12.) Do you utilize any of the following IDS Tools? Zeek/Bro, Snort, Suricata, SecurityOnion,
Sagan.
▢ Zeek/Bro  (1)
▢ Snort  (2)
▢ Suricata  (3)
▢ SecurityOnion  (4)
▢ Sagan  (5)
▢ Other  (6)
▢ Can't Disclose  (7)
Q12.2.) Which others do you use? --- Display This Question: If “Do you utilize any of
the following IDS Tools? Zeek/Bro, Snort, Suricata, SecurityOnion, Sagan.”  = Other
Q13.) Does your organization have cybersecurity insurance?
o Yes  (1)
o No  (2)
o Unsure  (3)
o Can't Disclose  (4)
Q13.2.) What type of incidents are covered?  --- Display This Question: If “Does your
organization have cybersecurity insurance?” = Yes
Q13.2.1)  What extent do they protect the local government’s data as well as overall
constituent data?  --- Display This Question: If “Does your organization have cybersecurity
insurance?” = Yes
Q13.3) What barriers do you face in utilizing such insurances?  --- Display This
Question: If “Does your organization have cybersecurity insurance?” = No
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Q14.) How has the support given to cybersecurity changed over the past 12 months? (i.e.,
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